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Abstract
We juxtapose the main characteristics of 2403 foreign aﬃliates with and with-
out intra-ﬁrm trade in 19 sub-Saharan-African countries in 2010. While intra-ﬁrm
trade is scarce among foreign aﬃliates in the sample, arm’s length trade is a very
popular activity, even among those with intra-ﬁrm trade. The main distinguish-
ing features of the average foreign aﬃliate with intra-ﬁrm trade are its larger size
and higher productivity level. Its size premia range between 31.5% and 56.3%
and its productivity premia between 25.4% and 30.7%.
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1 Introduction1
Multinational Companies (henceforth MNCs) constitute the main locomotive in the
current process of internationalisation of production and markets. This stylised fact
has spawned numerous theoretical and empirical studies on diﬀerent types of FDI (i.e.,
horizontal2, vertical3, and export-platform4 FDI) and MNCs, as well as combinations
of these (Carr et al., 2001; Grossman et al., 2006; Irarrazabal et al., 2013). UNCTAD
(1998) is the ﬁrst to report empirical evidence on such combinations. In addition,
Feinberg and Keane (2001) study US MNCs with aﬃliates in Canada and ﬁnd that
only 12% of these are of purely horizontal type and only 19% of purely vertical. Thus,
terms such as “complex integration strategies” and “complex FDI” have been coined
(UNCTAD, 1998; Yeaple, 2003a; Helpman, 2006).
Despite the latest evidence, we still have a very limited knowledge about the main
features that distinguish foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm trade from those without.
Hanson et al. (2001) are the ﬁrst to examine imports of foreign aﬃliates from their US
parent companies by using a measure of aﬃliate size. Ramondo et al. (2011), with the
use of the BEA data on roughly the whole population of foreign aﬃliates of US MNCs,
ﬁnd that intra-ﬁrm trade is concentrated among a small number of relatively large
foreign aﬃliates, while the median foreign aﬃliate, which is smaller in size, reports no
shipments to its parent and directs the bulk of its sales to non-aﬃliated parties in the
host country. The main objective of this paper is to shed more light on the main ﬁrm
characteristics that discern foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm trade from those without.
To this purpose, by employing data from the UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010
we juxtapose the main characteristics of 2403 foreign aﬃliates with and without intra-
ﬁrm trade located in 19 countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in 2010. Their parent
companies are based either in high-income, or non-SSA low/middle-income, or SSA
countries. In contrast to the vast majority of previous theoretical and empirical studies
which take into consideration only the manufacturing sector, this study covers all three
main sectors of the economy (i.e., primary, secondary, and tertiary).
Given the well-documented rise in MNC activity in Africa and especially, in sub-
Saharan Africa, our ﬁndings can prove to be very useful for policy makers in host
1We thank audiences at the UCLouvain IEG seminar, the UCLouvain DW May 2014, the ITSG
July 2014, the ETSG 2014, the XIX DEGIT 2014, the KUL CoE ISS Fall 2014, and the 8th FIW
2014 for their comments and suggestions. Special thanks are extended to Costas Arkolakis, Gabor
Be´ke´s, Rosario Crino`, Giorgia Giovannetti, Amanda Jakobsson, Florian Mayneris, Mathieu Parenti,
and Luc´ıa Pe´rez-Villar. Sotiris Blanas gratefully acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the Fonds de la
Recherche Scientiﬁque – FNRS. All errors are ours.
2The MNC serves the foreign market by setting up a foreign aﬃliate rather than through exports.
In doing so, the production process of the parent company is replicated in the foreign aﬃliate. Among
others, see Caves (1982), Markusen (1984), Brainard (1997), Helpman et al. (2004), Horstmann and
Markusen (1992), Markusen and Venables (2000), Ramondo et al. (2013).
3The MNC takes advantage of international factor diﬀerentials by transferring part of its production
process to countries where factor prices are lower (Helpman, 1984; Helpman and Krugman, 1985,
Yeaple, 2003b and Yeaple, 2008). In this case, intra-ﬁrm trade is created, as has been observed by
several recent empirical studies (Hanson et al., 2001; Hanson et al., 2005; Borga and Zeile, 2004;
OECD, 2002; Alfaro and Charlton, 2009).
4An aﬃliate located in a foreign country is used as platform for serving other markets nearby via
exports (Ekholm et al., 2007; Badinger and Egger, 2010).
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countries to implement such industrial, trade, investment and development policies so
that their countries beneﬁt the most from the presence of MNCs.
Africa and in particular, sub-Saharan Africa, still lag behind other developing re-
gions like Asia and Latin America, regarding their FDI inﬂows and their participation
in regional and global value chains (UNCTAD, 2013, p. 39). However, since FDI could
be an essential source of ﬁnance for industrialisation of the region, Africa is increas-
ingly tapping into it. According to UNCTAD and UNIDO (2011, p. 77), its FDI inﬂows
increased from $2.8 billion to $58.6 billion between 1990 and 2009, while the share of
FDI in gross ﬁxed capital formation increased from 3.2% to 24.1% between 1990 and
2007. Although most of FDI inﬂows by value are concentrated in Mining, important
investment activities have taken place in Manufacturing between 2003 and 2009. UNC-
TAD (2010b) reports that 41% of the total number of Greenﬁeld investment projects
in Africa were accounted for by the manufacturing sector.
Although developed countries account for the bulk of the FDI ﬂows into Africa,
non-African developing countries – especially Brazil, China, India, and Turkey – are
increasingly important sources. Their share in total FDI inﬂows to Africa increased
from an average of 17.7% during the period 1995 - 1999 to 20.8% over the period
2000 - 2008 (UNCTAD, 2010a, p. 81). According to the same study, FDI from non-
African developing countries is mostly in natural resources but there are signiﬁcant
investments in infrastructure,5 ﬁnance, agriculture and light manufacturing. UNCTAD
(2013, p. 127) reports that there has also been a remarkable increase over the past
decade in intra-African investment, with 68% of Greenﬁeld investment being accounted
for by the services sector.
As regards trade activity which is very closely linked to FDI, Africa has experienced
a signiﬁcant rise in total merchandise trade, from $7 billion in 1995 to $86 billion in
2008. This has been accompanied by increasing trade with other non-African developing
countries. Also, its share of global trade rose from 2.2% in 2000 to 3.3% in 2008
(UNCTAD, 2010a, p. 29).
In line with Ramondo et al. (2011), the data analysis reveals that intra-ﬁrm trade
is concentrated among a small number of ﬁrms. In particular, foreign aﬃliates with
intra-ﬁrm trade account for only 21.9% of all ﬁrms in the sample. This is an essential
stylised fact because it poses the critical question as to why ﬁrm boundaries exist if not
for the transfer of physical goods. According to Atalay et al. (2014), the main reason
for their existence is the transfer of intangibles.6
Interestingly, though, we ﬁnd that the big majority of foreign aﬃliates do trade, but
they mostly do so outside the boundaries of the ﬁrm (i.e., at arm’s length). Roughly
half of the total number of ﬁrms in the sample have only arm’s length trade. Trade
at arm’s length is also a very popular activity even among foreign aﬃliates with intra-
ﬁrm trade. These ﬁndings are important in two ways. First, they are indicative of
5Between 2001 and 2007, China’s infrastructure ﬁnance commitment in sub-Saharan Africa rose
from $470 million to $4.5 billion. Other countries with signiﬁcant investments in infrastructure are
India, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UNCTAD, 2010b, p. 81; UNCTAD,
2010a).
6Many terms which are related to intangibles can be found in the literature: knowledge capital
(Markusen, 1984), technology capital (McGrattan and Prescott, 2010), organisational capital (Garicano
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006), core capabilities (Bernard et al., 2012), managerial ability (Bloom and
Van Reenen, 2007), capabilities (Atalay et al., 2014).
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the complexity that characterises import and export activities of foreign aﬃliates and
justiﬁes terms that have been coined in the literature, such as “complex” FDI. Second, it
shows how opaque the ﬁrm boundaries remain despite the great progress that has been
made in recent years both in theory (Antra`s, 2003) and in empirics (Nunn and Treﬂer,
2013; Corcos et al., 2013). Unfortunately, in our data we do not observe ﬁrm-to-ﬁrm
transactions by product and therefore, we cannot look into this issue further.
From the regression analysis we ﬁnd that the main distinguishing ﬁrm characteristics
of the average foreign aﬃliate with intra-ﬁrm are its greater size and higher produc-
tivity level. The ﬁrst ﬁnding is in accord with Ramondo et al. (2011). We report size
premia of 31.5% and 56.3% when proxied by the total number of employees and total
sales, respectively. The productivity premia are 25.4% and 25.5% when productivity
is proxied by the ratios of total sales and total value added to total employment. The
estimated total factor productivity premia are 30.7%.
After decomposing intra-ﬁrm trade into intra-ﬁrm imports, exports and both im-
ports and exports, we ﬁnd that a clear sorting pattern arises. On average, foreign
aﬃliates with both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports seem to be the biggest and most
productive ﬁrms, those with only intra-ﬁrm exports smaller and less productive, those
with only intra-ﬁrm imports even smaller and less productive, while those with only
arm’s length trade are bigger and more productive only than those without intra-ﬁrm
trade, which are the smallest and least productive ﬁrms. Reporting these premia be-
comes even more important after we show that foreign aﬃliates with only arm’s length
trade diﬀer from domestic ﬁrms which engage in international trade in terms of size and
productivity. They are bigger and more productive by 11.9% and 25.7%, respectively.
The sorting pattern can be easily explained theoretically based on the Melitz (2003)
model of ﬁrm heterogeneity in which the ﬁxed cost of arm’s length trade is smaller
than the ﬁxed cost of intra-ﬁrm imports, which in turn, is smaller than the ﬁxed cost
of intra-ﬁrm exports.
We draw some novel and useful conclusions about the host-country eﬀects of FDI
based on the results that we obtain. The greater size of the average foreign aﬃliate
with intra-ﬁrm trade can be translated into a greater number of job opportunities for
local job-market seekers. In addition, any local ﬁrms which manage to develop linkages
with this type of foreign aﬃliate may beneﬁt by more from productivity spillovers due
to its productivity advantage.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data and
report several stylised facts on the host countries, industries and parent locations of the
two types of aﬃliates, diﬀerent combinations of these, as well as, on their distributions
by size and productivity. In Section 3 we present the benchmark econometric model,
while in Section 4 the main empirical results, robustness checks and the estimated size
and productivity premia. In Section 5 we provide a simple theoretical explanation for
the self-selection of foreign aﬃliates into intra-ﬁrm trade based on the model of ﬁrm
heterogeneity of Melitz (2003), while in Section 6 the main concluding remarks and
suggestions for further research.
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2 Data and stylised facts
In this section we describe the main dataset to be employed in the econometric analysis
and juxtapose foreign aﬃliates with and without intra-ﬁrm trade in terms of the host
countries in which they are located and all possible combinations of the origin of their
parent company and the industries in which they operate. We also provide statistics
on the percentage of foreign aﬃliates with diﬀerent types of trade ﬂows (i.e., intra-ﬁrm
and/or arm’s length) and try to quantify any size and productivity premia of foreign
aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm trade.
2.1 Data
We draw all ﬁrm-level data from the UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010. The main
aim of this survey is to collect information at the ﬁrm level directly from business owners
and senior managers about their business and their assessment of the current business
environment. It includes information about 2403 foreign aﬃliates in 19 sub-Saharan-
African countries for the last ﬁnancial year (i.e., 2009). All monetary variables are in
national currencies and in order to convert these into US dollars (USD), we rely on the
exchange rate data of the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI).
As regards intra-ﬁrm trade, this is directly observed in the data and therefore, we
do not need to construct ourselves any proxy for vertical relationship based on Input-
Output (I-O) tables or disaggregated classiﬁcations of products/services produced in
the parent and the foreign aﬃliate (Alfaro and Charlton, 2009). In particular, we claim
that a foreign aﬃliate has intra-ﬁrm imports if its percentage of production inputs by
value that was imported through the parent company is greater than 0 and less than
or equal to 100. Similarly, a foreign aﬃliate has intra-ﬁrm exports if its percentage of
direct exports by value is supplied to its parent and/or its sister aﬃliates is greater
than 0 and less than or equal to 100. Consequently, a foreign aﬃliate with intra-ﬁrm
trade is an entity that satisﬁes one of the two or both of the aforementioned conditions
(i.e., the ﬁrm has either intra-ﬁrm imports, or intra-ﬁrm exports, or both).
2.2 Foreign aﬃliates with and without intra-ﬁrm trade
Table 1 portrays the 19 countries in sub-Saharan Africa where foreign aﬃliates with
and without intra-ﬁrm trade are located. Among ﬁrms with inta-ﬁrm trade, the biggest
number of these are based in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana and Cameroon (17.3%,
16.2%, 8%, 5.9%, and 5.7%, respectively), while the smallest number in Niger (0.8%),
Burundi (1%), Burkina Faso (1.1%), Mali (2.5%), and Malawi (2.7%). Among ﬁrms
without intra-ﬁrm trade, the biggest number of these are based in Uganda (17.1%),
Kenya (10.7%), Ghana (8%), Nigeria (6.3%) and Mozambique (6.1%), and the smallest
number in Niger (1%), Burkina Faso (1.2%), Malawi (1.8%), Burundi (2.2%), Lesotho
and Rwanda (2.9% each).
Foreign aﬃliates without intra-ﬁrm trade operate in more industries than those with
intra-ﬁrm trade (56 industries Vs 41 industries). This is mostly driven by the absence
of aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm trade from many services industries. This is in line with
Ramondo et al. (2011) who ﬁnd that intra-ﬁrm trade occurs primarily in goods, rather
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than services. Among aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm trade, the highest percentages of these
are to be found in industries with ISIC 15 (11.8%), 25 (8.6%), 1 (8.4%), 24 and 51 (8.2%
each), 18 (7.6%), 52 (6.3%), and 45 (5.1%), while the lowest in industries with ISIC 2,
33, 41, 63, 71, 72, and 92 (0.2% each). Among aﬃliates without intra-ﬁrm trade, the
highest percentages of these operate in industries with ISIC 15 (8.4%), 51 (6.7%), 74
(5.6%), 45 (5.4%), 25 and 55 (5.2% each), 65 (5.1%), and 28 (4.9%), while the lowest in
industries with ISIC 12, 30, 73, 85, and 93 (0.1% each). To save on space, we relegate
to the Appendix the tables with the industries by type of foreign aﬃliate.
Table 1: Locations of foreign aﬃliates with and without intra-ﬁrm trade
with intra-ﬁrm trade without intra-ﬁrm trade
Name Code # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
Burundi BDI 5 1 41 2.2
Burkina Faso BFA 6 1.1 23 1.2
Cameroon CMR 30 5.7 103 5.5
Cape Verde CPV 22 4.2 82 4.4
Ethiopia ETH 24 4.6 109 5.8
Ghana GHA 31 5.9 151 8
Kenya KEN 91 17.3 200 10.7
Lesotho LSO 22 4.2 54 2.9
Madagascar MDG 27 5.1 96 5.1
Mali MLI 13 2.5 78 4.2
Mozambique MOZ 16 3 114 6.1
Malawi MWI 14 2.7 34 1.8
Niger NER 4 0.8 18 1
Nigeria NGA 30 5.7 119 6.3
Rwanda RWA 18 3.4 55 2.9
Senegal SEN 23 4.4 87 4.6
Tanzania TZA 42 8 113 6
Uganda UGA 85 16.2 321 17.1
Zambia ZMB 23 4.4 79 4.2
Total 526 100 1877 100
Notes: Authors’ calculations.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
As for the parent locations, parents of the highest percentage of aﬃliates with intra-
ﬁrm trade are located in India (10%), South Africa (9.5%), France and the United
Kingdom (8.7% each), Kenya (6.9%), the US (4.8%), China and the Netherlands (4.1%
each), Portugal (3.7%), Lebanon and Mauritius (2.5% each), Germany and Switzerland
(2.5%), Hong Kong and Taiwan (1.9%), Italy (1.7%), Japan (1.5%), Denmark, Spain
and the United Arab Emirates (1.4%), Belgium, Senegal, Uganda and Tanzania (1%).
Parents of the highest percentage of aﬃliates without intra-ﬁrm trade are located in
India (14%), France (9.8%), the United Kingdom (9.7%), South Africa (6.3%), China
and Kenya (6% each), Portugal (4.4%), Italy (4%), Lebanon (3.9%), the US (3.6%), the
Netherlands (2.1%), Switzerland (1.8%), Mauritius (1.7%), Germany (1.6%), Canada
(1.2%), and Belgium (0.9%).
Table 2 reports the number of ﬁrms with and without intra-ﬁrm trade by sector
and parent location. Regarding sectors, we consider the whole economy (ISIC be-
tween 1 and 99), Agriculture (ISIC between 1 and 5), Mining (ISIC between 10 and
14), Manufacturing (ISIC between 15 and 39), Resource-based manufacturing (ISIC:
15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27), Low-tech manufacturing (ISIC: 17, 18, 19, 22, 28,
36), Medium/High-tech manufacturing (ISIC: 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38),
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Electricity, gas and water supply (EGW supply) and Construction (ISIC 40 and 45,
respectively), and Services (ISIC between 50 and 99). We distinguish between three
diﬀerent types of parent location based on the income level of the country in which
the parent company is situated (i.e., high-income countries (HI), low/middle-income
excluding sub-Saharan-African ones (LMI), and those in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)).
In order to classify each parent location by the level of income we rely upon the World
Bank Historical Country Classiﬁcation for the year 2010. Low/middle-income countries
are those which are classiﬁed by the World Bank for the corresponding year as either
low-income, or lower-middle-income, or upper-middle-income.
For the whole economy, the parent ﬁrms of the highest percentage of aﬃliates
with intra-ﬁrm trade are located in high-income countries, of the second highest in
low/middle-income countries, while those of the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa (52.4%,
33.4%, and 14.2%, respectively). This is also true for Agriculture (74.5%, 12.8%,
12.8%, respectively), Mining (53.3%, 46.7%, 0%, respectively), Manufacturing (50.6%,
36.3%, 13.1%, respectively), Resource-based manufacturing (52.3%, 31.5%, 16.1%, re-
spectively), Medium/High-tech manufacturing (66.7%, 22.2%, 11.1%, respectively),
EGW supply and Construction (50%, 35.7%, 14.3%, respectively), and Services (47.9%,
31.3%, 20.8%, respectively). The only exception is the low-tech manufacturing sector
in which the parents of the highest percentage of foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm trade
are based in low/middle-income countries (36.4%, 53.5%, and 10.1%, respectively).
As far as foreign aﬃliates without intra-ﬁrm trade are concerned, the parents of
the smallest percentage of these are located in sub-Saharan Africa. This holds for the
whole economy and for any other sector examined. The diﬀerences in the percentages
of aﬃliates whose parents are located in high- and non-SSA low/middle-income coun-
tries are much smaller than before (Whole economy: 49.4% Vs 37%, Manufacturing:
44.9% Vs 43.3%, Resource-based manufacturing: 43.9% Vs 43.4%, Medium/High-tech
manufacturing: 47.8% Vs 40.8%) or even vanished (Low-tech manufacturing: 44.8% Vs
44.8%). Sectors for which there are still quite big diﬀerences are: Agriculture (60.7%
Vs 21.3%), Mining (58.8% Vs 41.2%), EGW supply and Construction (56% Vs 35.8%)
and Services (51.5% Vs 32.1%).
Panel A in Table 3 reveals that intra-ﬁrm trade is a relatively rare activity. Only 526
out of the 2403 foreign aﬃliates (21.9% of the total) trade with their parent company
(i.e., they have either intra-ﬁrm imports or intra-ﬁrm exports, or both). The rest 1877
(78.1% of the total) do not have any intra-ﬁrm trade ﬂows. Among the ﬁrms with
intra-ﬁrm trade, 77.8% of these have intra-ﬁrm imports (Panel B), 39.4% have intra-
ﬁrm exports (Panel C), 17.1% have both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports (Panel D),
60.6% have only intra-ﬁrm imports (Panel E), while 22.2% have only intra-ﬁrm exports
(Panel F).
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Table 2: Foreign investors’ origin
with intra-ﬁrm trade without intra-ﬁrm trade
Parent location # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
Whole economy
High-income country 265 52.4 871 49.4
Low/middle-income country 169 33.4 653 37
sub-Saharan African country 72 14.2 240 13.6
Total 506 100 1764 100
Agriculture
High-income country 35 74.5 37 60.7
Low/middle-income country 6 12.8 13 21.3
sub-Saharan African country 6 12.8 11 18
Total 47 100 61 100
Mining
High-income country 8 53.3 20 58.8
Low/middle-income country 7 46.7 14 41.2
sub-Saharan African country 0 0 0 0
Total 15 100 34 100
Manufacturing
High-income country 162 50.6 347 44.9
Low/middle-income country 116 36.3 334 43.3
sub-Saharan African country 42 13.1 91 11.8
Total 320 100 772 100
Resource-based manufacturing
High-income country 78 52.3 165 43.9
Low/middle-income country 47 31.5 163 43.4
sub-Saharan African country 24 16.1 48 12.8
Total 149 100 376 100
Low-tech manufacturing
High-income country 36 36.4 107 44.8
Low/middle-income country 53 53.5 107 44.8
sub-Saharan African country 10 10.1 25 10.5
Total 99 100 239 100
Medium/High-tech manufacturing
High-income country 48 66.7 75 47.8
Low/middle-income country 16 22.2 64 40.8
sub-Saharan African country 8 11.1 18 11.5
Total 72 100 157 100
EGW supply/Construction
High-income country 14 50 61 56
Low/middle-income country 10 35.7 39 35.8
sub-Saharan African country 4 14.3 9 8.3
Total 28 100 109 100
Services
High-income country 46 47.9 406 51.5
Low/middle-income country 30 31.3 253 32.1
sub-Saharan African country 20 20.8 129 16.4
Total 96 100 788 100
Notes: Authors’ calculations. Firms with intra-ﬁrm trade are those with either intra-ﬁrm imports, or intra-
ﬁrm exports or both. Resource-based manufacturing industry codes: 15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 27. Low-tech
manufacturing industry codes: 17, 18, 19, 22, 28, 36. Medium/High-tech manufacturing industry codes: 24, 29,
30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38. EGW supply: Electricity, gas and water supply (ISIC: 40). SSA: Foreign investors’
country of origin is sub-Saharan African. Foreign investors’ country of origin is classiﬁed as high-income (HI) and
non-SSA low/middle-income (LMI) based on the World Bank historical country classiﬁcation for the year 2010,
and for the very few ﬁrms which answered the questionnaire in 2009, for that speciﬁc year. Low/Middle-income
countries are those which are classﬁed by the World Bank for the corresponding year as either low-income, or
lower-middle-income, or upper-middle-income.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
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Table 3: Foreign aﬃliates with and without intra-ﬁrm trade
Panel A: With intra-ﬁrm trade # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 1877 78.1
Yes 526 21.9
Total 2403 100
Panel B: With intra-ﬁrm imports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 117 22.2
Yes 409 77.8
Total 526 100
Panel C: With intra-ﬁrm exports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 319 60.6
Yes 207 39.4
Total 526 100
Panel D: With both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 436 82.9
Yes 90 17.1
Total 526 100
Panel E: With intra-ﬁrm imports only # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 207 39.4
Yes 319 60.6
Total 526 100
Panel F: With intra-ﬁrm exports only # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 409 77.8
Yes 117 22.2
Total 526 100
Notes: Authors’ calculations. Firms with intra-ﬁrm trade are those with either intra-ﬁrm imports, or intra-
ﬁrm exports or both.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
Table 4: Foreign aﬃliates with diﬀerent types of trade
Panel A: With trade # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 660 27.5
Yes 1743 72.5
Total 2403 100
Panel B: With 100% arms’ length trade # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 1186 49.4
Yes 1217 50.6
Total 2403 100
Panel C: With 100% intra-ﬁrm trade # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 2226 92.6
Yes 177 7.4
Total 2403 100
Panel D: With both intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length trade # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 2054 85.48
Yes 349 14.52
Total 2403 100.00
Notes: Authors’ calculations. Firms with trade are those with either imports, or exports or both.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
The fact that most of the foreign aﬃliates in our sample do not engage in intra-ﬁrm
trade does not mean that they do not trade at all. They do trade, but they only do so
outside the boundaries of the ﬁrm (i.e., at arm’s length), as shown in Table 4. According
to Panel A, 1743 out of 2403 foreign aﬃliates (72.5% of the total) have either type of
trade (i.e., either intra-ﬁrm or arms’ length) and according to Panel B, 1217 or 50.6%
of the total trade only at arms’ length. Panels C and D reveal that arms’ length trade
is a popular activity also among foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm trade. Only 177 out
of the 526 have only intra-ﬁrm trade, the rest 349 have a combination of both.
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As shown in Table 5, among the 1743 foreign aﬃliates which have any of the two
types of trade, 88.4% of these are importers (i.e., either intra-ﬁrm importers, or arms’
length importers, or both) (Panel A), 48.9% are exporters (i.e., either intra-ﬁrm ex-
porters, or arms’ length exporters, or both) (Panel B), 37.3% are both importers and
exporters (Panel C), 51.1% are only importers (Panel D), and 11.6% are only exporters
(Panel E).
Table 6 shows that among the 1540 importers, 73.4% of these import only at arms’
length (Panel A), while 9.2% only intra-ﬁrm (Panel B). For the 853 exporters, I show
that 75.7% of these export only at arms’ length (Panel C), while 6.2% only intra-ﬁrm
(Panel D). The vast majority of the 650 importers-exporters trade only at arms’ length
(86.2%) (Panel E). Only 17% of these import and export only from and to their parent
and/or other aﬃliated parties (Panel F).
Table 5: Foreign aﬃliates with and without trade
Panel A: With imports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 203 11.6
Yes 1540 88.4
Total 1743 100
Panel B: With exports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 890 51.1
Yes 853 48.9
Total 1743 100
Panel C: With both imports and exports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 1093 62.7
Yes 650 37.3
Total 1743 100
Panel D: With imports only # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 853 48.9
Yes 890 51.1
Total 1743 100
Panel E: With exports only # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 1540 88.4
Yes 203 11.6
Total 1743 100
Notes: Authors’ calculations. Imports and exports are either intra-ﬁrm or arms’ length or
both.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
In Table 7 we provide evidence on foreign aﬃliates with various combinations of
intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length trade ﬂows. We show that 15.4% of the 1743 foreign aﬃliates
with trade have both intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length imports, 8.8% have both intra-ﬁrm and
arms’ length exports, 4.2% have intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length imports and exports, 6.4%
have intra-ﬁrm imports and only arms’ length exports, 4.6% have intra-ﬁrm exports
and only arms’ length imports, 4.5% have intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length imports and
only arms’ length exports, 3.8% have intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length exports and only
arms’ length imports, 3.8% have intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length imports and intra-ﬁrm
exports, 3.4% have intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length exports and intra-ﬁrm imports, 0.7%
have intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length imports and only intra-ﬁrm exports, and ﬁnally, 0.4%
have intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length exports and only intra-ﬁrm imports. We also produce
the tables for those with intra-ﬁrm and/or arms’ length trade, for those which trade
only at arms’ length, as well as for those which trade only intra-ﬁrm by sector and by
sector-parent location pairs. The tables reveal a salient heterogeneity across sectors and
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across sector-parent location pairs. Foreign aﬃliates which trade only at arms’ length
are the majority in all sectors and for almost all sector-parent location pairs.
Table 6: Foreign aﬃliates with 100% arms’ length trade and 100% intra-ﬁrm trade
Panel A: With 100% arms’ length imports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 409 26.6
Yes 1131 73.4
Total 1540 100
Panel B: With 100% intra-ﬁrm imports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 1399 90.8
Yes 141 9.2
Total 1540 100
Panel C: With 100% arms’ length exports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 207 24.3
Yes 646 75.7
Total 853 100
Panel D: With 100% intra-ﬁrm exports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 800 93.8
Yes 53 6.2
Total 853 100
Panel E: With both 100% arms’ length imports and exports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 90 13.8
Yes 560 86.2
Total 650 100
Panel F: With both 100% intra-ﬁrm imports and exports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 633 97.4
Yes 17 2.6
Total 650 100
Notes: Authors’ calculations. Panel A: Firms whose 100% of imports are at arms’ length. Panel B: Firms whose 100% of
imports are intra-ﬁrm. Panel C: Firms whose 100% of exports are at arms’ length. Panel D: Firms whose 100% of exports
are intra-ﬁrm. Panel E: Firms whose 100% of imports and 100% of exports are at arms’ length. Panel F: Firms whose
100% of imports and 100% of exports are intra-ﬁrm.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
In sum, although most of the foreign aﬃliates in our sample engage in trade activi-
ties, they do so mostly at arms’ length. Arm’s length trade is a popular activity even
among foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm trade. By contrast, intra-ﬁrm trade is scarce.
Despite the great progress that has been made in recent years both in theory (Antra`s,
2003) and in empirics (Nunn and Treﬂer, 2013; Corcos et al., 2013) on the determinants
of ﬁrm boundaries, the fact that most of the foreign aﬃliates in our sample, even
those with intra-ﬁrm trade, engage in trade with unaﬃliated parties, calls for further
investigation of this issue. Unfortunately, the data available to us lack ﬁrm-to-ﬁrm
transactions by product and therefore, we cannot look into this issue.
What is more, the scarcity of intra-ﬁrm trade makes one wonder as to why ﬁrm
boundaries exist, if not for the transfer of physical goods. Atalay et al. (2014) argue
that the primary reason for the existence of ﬁrm boundaries is the transfer of intangi-
bles, rather than tangible goods. Hence, they imply that intangibles, when transferred
through the market, are subject to the same ineﬃciencies as physical goods (Grossman
and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Antra`s, 2003) and that these ineﬃciencies are
mitigated when they are transferred within the ﬁrm boundaries.7
7According to the Property Rights Theory (PRT), the ﬁrm boundaries ensure that the owner has
residual rights of control over relationship-speciﬁc assets.
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Table 7: Foreign aﬃliates with combinations of intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length trade
Panel A: With intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length imports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 1475 84.6
Yes 268 15.4
Total 1743 100
Panel B: With intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length exports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 1589 91.2
Yes 154 8.8
Total 1743 100
Panel C: With intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length imports and exports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 1670 95.8
Yes 73 4.2
Total 1743 100
Panel D: With intra-ﬁrm imports and arms’ length exports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 1632 93.6
Yes 111 6.4
Total 1743 100
Panel E: With intra-ﬁrm exports and arms’ length imports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 1663 95.4
Yes 80 4.6
Total 1743 100
Panel F: With intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length imports and arms’ length exports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 1665 95.5
Yes 78 4.5
Total 1743 100
Panel G: With intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length exports and arms’ length imports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 1677 96.2
Yes 66 3.8
Total 1743 100
Panel H: With intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length imports and intra-ﬁrm exports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 1677 96.2
Yes 66 3.8
Total 1743 100
Panel I: With intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length exports and intra-ﬁrm imports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 1683 96.6
Yes 60 3.4
Total 1743 100
Panel J: With intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length imports and 100% intra-ﬁrm exports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 1730 99.3
Yes 13 0.7
Total 1743 100
Panel K: With intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length exports and 100% intra-ﬁrm imports # of ﬁrms % of ﬁrms
No 1736 99.6
Yes 7 0.4
Total 1743 100
Notes: Authors’ calculations.
Source: UNIDO Africa Investor Survey 2010.
Table 8 displays the same statistics as in Table 3 by sector and parent location. In
terms of sectors, the highest percentage of foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm trade oper-
ate in Agriculture (43%), Mining (32.7%), and Manufacturing (28.8%), while the lowest
percentage in Services (10.7%) and EGW supply and Construction (19.3%). Within
manufacturing, the percentage of the same type of aﬃliate in resource-based indus-
tries is a bit smaller than the whole sector (27.7%), that in low-tech industries almost
identical (28.7%), and that in medium/high-tech industries slightly bigger (31.4%). In
Panel A.1, the percentages of foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm trade whose parents are
located in high-income countries are bigger than before in Agriculture (48.6%), Man-
ufacturing (31.8%), and in particular, in Resource-based manufacturing (32.1%) and
Medium/High-tech manufacturing (39%). Instead, they are smaller in Mining (28.6%)
11
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and Low-tech manufacturing (25.2%), and only slightly smaller in EGW supply and
Construction (18.7%) and Services (10.2%).
The pattern is a bit diﬀerent for foreign aﬃliates whose parents are located in non-
SSA low/middle-income countries and in SSA countries (Panel A.2 and Panel A.3). The
percentages for the ﬁrst, as compared to those in Panel A, are higher in Mining (33.3%),
Low-tech manufacturing (33.1%), and EGW supply and Construction (20.4%), while
lower or roughly equal in Agriculture (31.6%), Manufacturing (25.8%), Resource-based
and Medium/High-tech manufacturing (22.4% and 20%, respectively), and in Services
(10.6%). The percentages for the second are smaller or roughly equal in Agriculture
(35.3%), and in Low-tech and Medium/High-tech manufacturing (28.6% and 30.8%,
respectively), while bigger in Manufacturing (31.6%), Resource-based manufacturing
(33.3%), EGW supply and Construction (30.8%), and Services (13.4%). There are no
foreign investors from sub-Saharan Africa with foreign aﬃliates in Mining.
Panel B shows that among ﬁrms with intra-ﬁrm trade, the highest percentages of
those with intra-ﬁrm imports operate in Services (99%), EGW supply and Construc-
tion (96.4%), Mining (88.2%), Low-tech manufacturing (82.5%), Medium/High-tech
manufacturing (76.3%), Manufacturing (73.2%), while the lowest in Agriculture (51%)
and Resource-based manufacturing (65.4%). Panels B.1-B.3 reveal that the patterns
for foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm imports whose parents are located in any of the
three country types are very similar to the one in Panel B. The main diﬀerences are
observed in Agriculture in which there is a smaller percentage of foreign aﬃliates with
intra-ﬁrm imports whose parents are located in high-income countries (42.9%), while
a higher percentage of those whose parents are located in non-SSA low/middle-income
and SSA countries (66.7% and 83.3%, respectively). In addition, while the percentage of
ﬁrms with intra-ﬁrm imports whose parents are located in non-SSA low/middle-income
countries is higher in Medium/High-tech manufacturing (87.5%), that of ﬁrms whose
parents are located in SSA countries is much smaller (62.5%).
According to Panel C, the highest percentages of foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm
exports are found in Agriculture (73.5%), Mining (52.9%), and Resource-based man-
ufacturing (52.3%), while the lowest ones in Services (2%) and in EGW supply and
Construction (7.1%). Panels C.1 to C.3 reveal that the percentage of ﬁrms with intra-
ﬁrm exports whose parents are located in high-income countries is higher than the
one in Panel C in all industries except for Medium/High-tech manufacturing (37.5% Vs
38.2%), while the percentages of ﬁrms whose parents are located in non-SSA low/middle-
income countries and SSA countries are lower in all industries except for Low-tech and
Medium/High-tech manufacturing (Panel C.2: 50.9% Vs 47.6% and 43.8% Vs 38.2%,
respectively) and for EGW supply and Construction (Panel C.3: 25% Vs 7.1%).
Panel D indicates that the biggest percentages of foreign aﬃliates with both intra-
ﬁrm imports and exports are in Mining (41.2%), Low-tech manufacturing (30.1%), and
Agriculture (24.5%), while the smallest percentages in Services (1%) and EGW supply
and Construction (3.6%). The pattern in Panel D.1 (i.e., for ﬁrms whose parents are
located in high-income countries) is very similar to the one in Panel D. The percent-
ages though, of aﬃliates with both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports are much higher in
Mining (62.5%), and Resource-based and Low-tech manufacturing (24.4% and 36.1%,
respectively). However, the percentage of aﬃliates in Services is zero. Panel D.2 (i.e.,
foreign aﬃliates with both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports whose parents are located in
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non-SSA low/middle-income countries) displays a diﬀerent pattern. The highest per-
centages of these type of aﬃliates belong to Agriculture (33.3%), and Low-tech and
Medium/High-tech manufacturing (32.1% and 31.3%, respectively), while the lowest
ones to Services (3.3%) and Resource-based manufacturing (6.4%). EGW supply and
Construction includes no ﬁrms of this type. Panel D.3 (i.e., foreign aﬃliates with both
intra-ﬁrm imports and exports whose parents are based in SSA countries) shows that
there are no ﬁrms of this type in Mining, Medium/High-tech manufacturing, EGW
supply and Construction, and Services. Also, their percentages in Agriculture, and
Resource-based and Low-tech manufacturing are much smaller than those in Panel D.
Panel E displays for each sector the percentages of foreign aﬃliates which have only
intra-ﬁrm imports. The highest ones are found in Services (98%) and EGW supply and
Construction (92.9%), in Manufacturing (52.4%), and in particular, in Low-tech and
Medium/High-tech manufacturing (52.4% and 61.8%, respectively). The lowest ones
are found in Agriculture (26.5%) and Mining (47.1%). Most of these percentages decline
in all industries but Services and EGW supply and Construction when the parents of
these aﬃliates are based in high-income countries. The percentages of ﬁrms whose
parents are in non-SSA low/middle-income countries (Panel E.2) and in SSA countries
(Panel E.3) remain as high as in Panel E in Services and EGW supply and Construction.
The percentages of the ﬁrst ﬁrm type are higher in Agriculture (33.3%) and in Mining
(71.4%). There are not any diﬀerences in Manufacturing. The percentages of the second
ﬁrm type are much higher in Agriculture (66.7%) and in Low-tech manufacturing (80%).
As Panels F to F.3 are mirror images of Panels E to Panel E.3, they indicate that
the lowest percentages of foreign aﬃliates which have only intra-ﬁrm exports are to
be found in Services (1%) and EGW supply and Construction (3.6%), regardless of
the origin of the parent company. In most of the industries, the percentage of foreign
aﬃliates whose parents come from high-income countries is higher than that in Panel F.
The opposite is true for foreign aﬃliates whose parents come from non-SSA low/middle-
income countries and SSA countries (Panels F.2 and F.3). The exceptions are ﬁrms in
Mining (14.3%), Resource-based manufacturing (36.2%), and Low-tech manufacturing
(18.9%) in Panel F.2, and ﬁrms in Manufacturing (31%), and especially, in Resource-
based manufacturing and Medium/High-tech manufacturing (37.5% each) in Panel F.3.
Given that foreign aﬃliates trade mostly at arms’ length, we produce the same tables
for those with trade (i.e., either intra-ﬁrm or arms’ length trade, or both) (Table A1),
for those which trade only at arms’ length (Table A2), as well as for those which trade
only within ﬁrm boundaries (Table A3). The tables are provided in the Appendix and
reveal, similar to Table 8, that there is salient heterogeneity by sector and by sector
and parent location. In contrast to foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm trade, those which
trade at arms’ length are the majority for almost all combinations of sectors and parent
locations.
Having found evidence for the scarcity of intra-ﬁrm trade as Ramondo et al. (2011),
and the popularity of arm’s length trade even among foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm
trade, we compare the distributions of the two ﬁrms types in terms of their size and
productivity level. The top panel of Figure ?? plots the kernel densities of the two
ﬁrm types in terms of their size, proxied by the log of the total number of employees,
while the bottom panel the densities in terms of their level of productivity, proxied
by the log of the ratio of total sales to total number of employees. Both panels show
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that the distribution of foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm trade is more skewed to the
left compared to the distribution of those without intra-ﬁrm trade. In other words, the
density of foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm trade is greater for higher values of size and
productivity.
Figure 1: Density of foreign aﬃliates by size and productivity
Figure 2: Foreign aﬃliates by size and productivity in percentiles
We draw the same conclusions from Figure 2 which plots the percentile distributions
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of the two ﬁrm types in terms of size (top panel) and productivity (bottom panel).
Foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm trade have higher size and productivity values at all
seven percentiles examined.
We obtain very similar kernel densities and percentile distributions in graphs that
we plot with alternative proxies for size and productivity. We proxy size with total sales
(Figures A1 and A2 in Appendix A) and productivity with the ratio of value added
to total number of employees (Figures A3 and A4 in Appendix A) and total factor
productivity (Figures A5 and A6 in Appendix A).
3 Econometric model
We estimate a probit model in order to investigate which ﬁrm characteristics are more
likely to be pertinent to one of the two ﬁrm types. For ﬁrm z in (host) country c and
industry j, whose parent company is located in country p, the estimating benchmark
model is the following:
Dift,zcjp =α + β1 ∗ skillIntzcjp + β2 ∗ capIntzcjp + β3 ∗ numEmpzcjp
+ β4 ∗ wageEmpzcjp + β5 ∗ labProdzcjp + β6 ∗ inpIntzcjp
+ β7 ∗Dtrainingzcjp + βc ∗Dc + βj ∗Dj + βp ∗Dp + zcjp
(1)
where the dependent variable, Dift,zcjp, is a dummy taking value 1 if ﬁrm z has any type
of intra-ﬁrm trade ﬂows (i.e., either intra-ﬁrm imports, or intra-ﬁrm exports, or both),
and 0 otherwise; skillInt is the log of skill intensity (i.e., share of technical, supervisory
and managerial employees in total number of employees), capInt is the log of capital
intensity (i.e., ratio of capital stock to total number of employees), numEmp is the log
of total number of employees as a proxy for ﬁrm size, wageEmp is the log of wage per
employee (i.e., total wage bill over total number of employees), labProd is the log of
labour productivity (i.e., ratio of total sales to total number of employees), inpInt is
the log of input intensity (i.e., ratio of value of inputs to total number of employees),
Dtraining is a dummy which takes value 1 if ﬁrm j provides formal internal/external
training to its employees and 0 otherwise, Dc is a set of host-country dummies, Dj a set
of industry dummies, and Dp a set of parent-location dummies (i.e., country of origin
of the parent company).
The host-country dummies control for any unobserved heterogeneity across the coun-
tries which receive foreign investment (e.g. cross-country diﬀerences in institutional
quality and business environment). By adding industry dummies, we control for any
unobserved heterogeneity across industries (e.g. technology and knowledge intensity
of industries). The parent-location dummies account for any unobserved heterogeneity
across the countries of origin of the investors (e.g. cross-country diﬀerences in corporate
culture).
The interpretation of the coeﬃcient estimates is as follows. A positive and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimate indicates that foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm trade
are more likely to acquire the respective characteristic as compared to those without
intra-ﬁrm trade. Likewise, a negative coeﬃcient estimate implies that the probability
foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm trade have the respective characteristic is lower.
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4 Empirical results
4.1 Main results
The results from the probit estimation of equation 1 are portrayed in column 1 of
Table 9. The coeﬃcient estimates of ﬁrm size and labour productivity are positive and
signiﬁcant at the level of 1%. The estimated coeﬃcients of skill and capital intensity
are negative but not statistically signiﬁcant. Those of the average wage, input intensity,
and the dummy for provision of training to employees are all positive and insigniﬁcant.
In column 2, we use total sales as an alternative proxy for ﬁrm size and drop labour
productivity in order to avoid collinearity. Its coeﬃcient estimate is still positive and
highly signiﬁcant. In columns 3, we run the same probit regression as in column 1, with
the only diﬀerence that we substitute total factor productivity for labour productivity.
By and large, the results are the same with those in column 1. The magnitude of the
coeﬃcient estimate of the main proxy for ﬁrm size is smaller and signiﬁcant only at 5%.
Table 9: Main characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dift Dift Dift Difex Difim Difimex
skillInt -0.0153 -0.0198 -0.0169 -0.00840 -0.00241 -0.00102
[0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.0086] [0.012] [0.0050]
capInt -0.00580 -0.00667 -0.00113 -0.00179 -0.00351 -0.000100
[0.0077] [0.0076] [0.0075] [0.0050] [0.0065] [0.0029]
numEmp 0.0476*** 0.0283** 0.0352*** 0.0232*** 0.0146***
[0.010] [0.012] [0.0069] [0.0087] [0.0041]
wageEmp 0.0170 0.0148 0.0147 0.000245 0.0178* 0.00267
[0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.0075] [0.0100] [0.0044]
labProd 0.0332*** 0.0231*** 0.0216** 0.0109**
[0.0099] [0.0071] [0.0087] [0.0048]
inpInt 0.00442 0.00132 0.00278 -0.00233 0.00739 0.00205
[0.0080] [0.0075] [0.0079] [0.0052] [0.0072] [0.0033]
Dtraining (d) 0.0219 0.0241 0.0187 -0.0126 0.0355* -0.00395
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.014] [0.019] [0.0088]
totSales 0.0403***
[0.0072]
tfp 0.0394***
[0.010]
Obs 1581 1581 1580 1247 1555 940
Pseudo−R2 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.28 0.17 0.30
Log − likelihood -730.0 -730.5 -728.1 -382.1 -644.2 -194.0
Notes: Probit estimations with host-country, parent-location and industry dummies in all columns. Standard errors are
clustered at the ﬁrm level. In column (2) total employment is replaced by total sales while dropping labour productivity
to avoid mutlicollinearity. In column (3) labour productivity is replaced by total factor productivity. Dift: ﬁrm has intra-
ﬁrm imports or exports, or both (dummy), Difex: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm exports (dummy), Difim: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports
(dummy), Difimex: ﬁrm has both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports (dummy), skillInt: skill intensity, capInt: capital intensity,
numEmp: ﬁrm size (total number of employees), numEmp: ﬁrm size (total sales), wageEmp: wage per employee, labProd:
labour productivity, tfp: total factor productivity, inpInt: input intensity, Dtraining : ﬁrm provides formal internal/external
training to its employees (dummy). Dummies take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. (d): discrete change of
dummy variable from 0 to 1. All variables are in logs except for dummies.
In column 4, we re-estimate the benchmark model by having as dependent variable
a dummy which takes value 1 if the foreign aﬃliate has intra-ﬁrm exports (Difex).
Aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm exports seem to be bigger and more productive than those
without intra-ﬁrm exports. The ﬁrst ﬁnding is in line with that of Ramondo et al.
(2011) who use the same dependent variable.
The same authors use also imports of foreign aﬃliates from their parent as dependent
variable. In the same direction, Hanson et al. (2001) study the ﬂows of intermediate
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goods from the parent to the foreign aﬃliate by using a measure of the aﬃliate size. In
addition, as already discussed in Section 2, we ﬁnd that, among foreign aﬃliates with
intra-ﬁrm trade, the number of these with intra-ﬁrm imports is exceptionally high in
many sectors of the economy (Mining, Low-tech and Medium/High-tech manufacturing,
EGW supply and Construction, Services). Hence, we estimate the benchmark model
with a dummy as dependent variable, which is equal to 1 if the foreign aﬃliate has
intra-ﬁrm imports. The results remain unchanged and are shown in column 5.
Using the narrow deﬁnition of “vertical” FDI, according to which the foreign aﬃliate
has both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports, we re-estimate the benchmark model after
replacing the dependent variable with a dummy which takes value 1 if the aﬃliate has
both intra-ﬁrm ﬂows. The main results still hold and are shown in column 6.
In short, we conclude that the average foreign aﬃliate with intra-ﬁrm trade tends
to have bigger size and higher level of productivity. In the next section, we perform
several test to check the robustness of these results.
4.2 Robustness checks
In this section, we perform several tests in order to check the robustness of the main
results of Table 9. All relevant tables are relegated to the Appendix. By and large, the
regressions estimated pass successfully the robustness checks.
We re-estimate all 7 regressions after restricting the sample to the manufacturing
sector (Table B1), to majority-owned foreign aﬃliates (MOFAs) (i.e., those owned by
their parent by at least 50%) in the whole economy (Table B2) and to MOFAs in
manufacturing (Table B3).
In the benchmark case we construct the dummy for intra-ﬁrm trade by assuming that
any missing observations of intra-ﬁrm imports and exports are due to the fact that the
ﬁrm did not have any intra-ﬁrm ﬂows and the respondent of the questionnaire left the
relevant questions unanswered. However, it may also be the case that the respondent
did not want to disclose such kind of information. We control for this possibility by
dropping all missing observations of intra-ﬁrm ﬂows. Then, we estimate all 7 regressions
for the whole economy (Table B4), the manufacturing sector (Table B5), for MOFAs in
the whole economy (Table B6) and the manufacturing sector (Table B7).
In order to ensure that the positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates of size and
productivity do not simply capture the age of the ﬁrm (i.e., the older the ﬁrm, the
bigger its size and the higher its productivity), we augment all 7 regressions with ﬁrm
age (Table B8).
We also test the sensitivity of results to alternative functional forms, such as the
logistic (Table B9) and linear probability models (Table B10).
We replace dummies for the country of the foreign investor with dummies for a
broader deﬁnition of parent location. That is, we construct dummies for whether the
parent is domiciled in a high-income, or non-SSA low/middle-income, or SSA country
(Table B11). We also replace the host-country and industry dummies with dummies
for pairs of host countries and industries (Table B12).
In robustness checks related to ﬁrm productivity and performance, we examine
any diﬀerences regarding the most important reason for production capacity under-
utilisation under normal circumstances. We ﬁnd that the probability of foreign aﬃliates
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with intra-ﬁrm trade not having their production capacity under-utilised under normal
circumstances is higher (Table B13). Motivated by the literature on credit constraints
and export performance (e.g. Chor and Manova, 2012) and the vulnerability of SSA to
ﬁnancial crises mostly through the disruption of the ﬁnance of trade channels (Berman
and Martin, 2010), we also identify any diﬀerences in the change in their performance
after the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2008. We use two diﬀerent measures. The ﬁrst is
based on the ﬁrm’s performance compared to overall expectations before the crisis
(Table B14) and compared to revised expectations after the crisis (Table B15). The
second is the average level of capacity utilisation of the ﬁrm three years before the crisis
and immediately after (Tables B16 to B20). There do not seem to be any statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in terms of ﬁrm performance either before or after the global
ﬁnancial crisis.
4.3 Selection into intra-ﬁrm trade
Helpman et al. (2004) and Bernard et al. (2007) ﬁnd that US exporters have a productiv-
ity advantage over US non-exporters in 1996 and 1997, respectively. The second study
also reports productivity and employment premia for importers over non-importers, as
well as for importers-exporters over those without imports and exports. Employment,
sales and productivity premia of importers over non-importers are also found by Antra`s
et al. (2014). Given that importing activities may result in an increase in ﬁrm produc-
tivity (Amiti and Konings, 2007), they also show that these premia existed before these
ﬁrms began importing. Since we don’t have data for any year prior to the one examined
(i.e., 2010), we are not able to test this either for imports or exports.
The graphical analysis in Section 2.2 shows that foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm
seem to have an advantage in terms of size and productivity. In Table 10, we show the
results from OLS regressions which quantify size and productivity premia. In Panel A,
we regress the log of each proxy for ﬁrm productivity and size on a dummy for intra-
ﬁrm trade (i.e., it takes value 1 if the foreign aﬃliates has either intra-ﬁrm imports, or
exports, or both) and additional controls such as: skill intensity, capital intensity, input
intensity, total employment, host-country, parent-location and industry dummies.8 The
proxies for ﬁrm productivity are the following: ratio of total sales to total employment
(column 1), ratio of value added to total employment (column 3), and total factor
productivity (column 5). The proxies for ﬁrm size are: total employment (column 2)
and total sales (column 4). We ﬁnd that the productivity premia are between 25.4%
(column 1) and 30.7% (column 5), while the size premia are between 31.5% (column 2)
and 56.3% (column 4).
In Panel B, we run the same regressions as in Panel A after controlling for ﬁrms with
only arms’ length trade. We do this by adding a dummy with value 1 if the ﬁrm has
either imports or exports or both, but only at arms’ length (Darmt). Not surprisingly,
we observe the same sorting pattern and even greater size and productivity premia.
8Firm size regressions omit the log of total employment as a covariate.
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Table 10: Productivity and size premia of foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm and arm’s
length trade
Panel A: Foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Productivity Size Productivity Size Productivity
Dift 0.254*** 0.315*** 0.255** 0.563*** 0.307***
[0.066] [0.066] [0.10] [0.090] [0.067]
Obs 1815 1831 1348 1815 1812
Panel B: Foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm and arm’s length trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Productivity Size Productivity Size Productivity
Dift 0.292*** 0.606*** 0.334** 0.888*** 0.376***
[0.094] [0.093] [0.14] [0.13] [0.096]
Darmt 0.0450 0.348*** 0.0958 0.390*** 0.0820
[0.083] [0.079] [0.11] [0.12] [0.084]
Obs 1815 1831 1348 1815 1812
Panel C: Foreign aﬃliates with diﬀerent intra-ﬁrm ﬂows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Productivity Size Productivity Size Productivity
Difimonly 0.255** 0.489*** 0.164 0.732*** 0.342***
[0.10] [0.11] [0.16] [0.15] [0.11]
Difexonly 0.282** 0.719*** 0.504*** 0.992*** 0.358***
[0.12] [0.13] [0.17] [0.17] [0.13]
Difimex 0.453*** 0.869*** 0.559** 1.308*** 0.536***
[0.17] [0.15] [0.24] [0.23] [0.17]
Darmt 0.0479 0.353*** 0.103 0.397*** 0.0848
[0.083] [0.079] [0.11] [0.12] [0.084]
Obs 1815 1831 1348 1815 1812
Notes: OLS estimations with control variables in both panels and all columns: skill intensity, capital intensity,
input intensity, total employment, host-country, parent-location and industry dummies. Firm size regressions
omit the log of total employment as a covariate. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Productivity
(column 1): log of the ratio of total sales to total employment. Size (column 2): total employment. Productivity
(column 3): log of the ratio of value added to total employment. Size (column 4): log of total sales. Productivity
(column 5): log of total factor productivity. Panels A and B: Dift: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports or exports, or
both (dummy). Panels B and C: Darmt: ﬁrm with arms’ length trade only (i.e., either arms’ length imports or
exports or both but with no intra-ﬁrm trade). Panel C: Difimonly : ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports only (dummy),
Difexonly : ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm exports only (dummy), Difimex: ﬁrm has both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports
(dummy). Dummies take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. All variables are in logs except for
dummies.
In Panel C, we regress the same dependent variables on dummies for intra-ﬁrm
imports only (i.e., it takes value 1 if the ﬁrm has only intra-ﬁrm imports), intra-ﬁrm
exports only (i.e., it takes value 1 if the ﬁrm has only intra-ﬁrm exports), for both intra-
ﬁrm imports and exports (i.e., it takes value 1 if the ﬁrm has both intra-ﬁrm imports
and exports), for arm’s length trade only, and the same control variables as in Panels
A and B. Column 1 shows that foreign aﬃliates with only intra-ﬁrm imports, with only
intra-ﬁrm exports and with both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports have a productivity
advantage of 25.5%, 28.2%, and 45.3%, respectively, over those without intra-ﬁrm trade.
The same sorting pattern arises when we use the other two proxies for ﬁrm productivity
in columns 3 and 5. In all three columns, we fail to ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant
premia for foreign aﬃliates which trade only at arm’s length. In terms of size premia,
these are: 48.9% for foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm imports only, 71.9% for foreign
aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm exports only, and 86.9% for foreign aﬃliates with both intra-
ﬁrm imports and exports (column 2). Those with arm’s length trade have the smallest
size premia, of 35.3%. We obtain the same sorting pattern with even larger premia
with the alternative proxy for ﬁrm size in column 4. We also ﬁnd the same sorting
pattern when we drop from the regressions the dummy for only arm’s length trade but,
as expected, the productivity and size premia are smaller.
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Table 11: Productivity and size premia of foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm and arm’s
length trade (Manufacturing sector)
Panel A: Foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Productivity Size Productivity Size Productivity
Dift 0.216*** 0.303*** 0.243** 0.524*** 0.296***
[0.076] [0.079] [0.12] [0.11] [0.081]
Obs 961 963 835 961 957
Panel B: Foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm and arm’s length trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Productivity Size Productivity Size Productivity
Dift 0.313*** 0.667*** 0.470*** 0.996*** 0.393***
[0.12] [0.12] [0.18] [0.18] [0.13]
Darmt 0.112 0.428*** 0.266 0.555*** 0.113
[0.11] [0.11] [0.16] [0.17] [0.12]
Obs 961 963 835 961 957
Panel C: Foreign aﬃliates with diﬀerent intra-ﬁrm ﬂows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Productivity Size Productivity Size Productivity
Difimonly 0.198 0.490*** 0.263 0.698*** 0.323**
[0.13] [0.13] [0.20] [0.20] [0.14]
Difexonly 0.386*** 0.820*** 0.615*** 1.218*** 0.407***
[0.13] [0.15] [0.21] [0.19] [0.14]
Difimex 0.533** 0.898*** 0.793*** 1.445*** 0.578**
[0.23] [0.17] [0.30] [0.30] [0.23]
Darmt 0.119 0.433*** 0.273* 0.563*** 0.118
[0.11] [0.11] [0.16] [0.17] [0.12]
Obs 961 963 835 961 957
Notes: OLS estimations with control variables in both panels and all columns: skill intensity, capital intensity,
input intensity, total employment, host-country, parent-location and industry dummies. Firm size regressions
omit the log of total employment as a covariate. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Productivity
(column 1): log of the ratio of total sales to total employment. Size (column 2): total employment. Productivity
(column 3): log of the ratio of value added to total employment. Size (column 4): log of total sales. Productivity
(column 5): log of total factor productivity. Panel A: Dift: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports or exports, or both
(dummy). Panel B: Difim: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports only (dummy), Difexonly : ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm exports
only (dummy), Difimex: ﬁrm has both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports (dummy). Panels A and B: Darmt:
ﬁrm with arms’ length trade only (i.e., either arms’ length imports or exports or both but with no intra-ﬁrm
trade) (dummy). Dummies take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. All variables are in logs
except for dummies.
We check the robustness of these results by restricting the sample to ﬁrms in manu-
facturing. All columns in Panels A and B of Table 11 conﬁrm the size and productivity
advantage of foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm. Same as in Panels A and B of Table 10,
the estimated premia are greater when foreign aﬃliates with only arm’s length trade are
controlled for. In addition, these premia are slightly smaller for foreign aﬃliates with
intra-ﬁrm trade in manufacturing than in the whole economy when we do not control
for foreign aﬃliates with only arm’s length trade. When we control for this type of
ﬁrms, their premia in manufacturing become greater than those in the whole economy.
Importantly, the sorting pattern still holds (Panel C).
The premia documented above may be driven by a potential similarity in terms of
size and productivity between foreign aﬃliates with only arm’s length trade and locally-
owned ﬁrms which engage in international trade. We compute size and productivity
premia of these two ﬁrm types and ﬁnd that foreign aﬃliates with only arm’s length
trade are dissimilar from domestic ﬁrms which trade. As shown in Table 12, they are
bigger and more productive by 11.9% and 25.7%, respectively. We obtain very similar
results after restricting the sample to ﬁrms in manufacturing (Table B21).
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Table 12: Productivity and size premia of foreign aﬃliates with arms’ length trade over
domestic ﬁrms with arms’ length trade
Panel A: Foreign aﬃliates with arms’ length trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Productivity Size Productivity Size Productivity
Dftrade 0.119*** 0.257*** 0.252*** 0.388*** 0.106**
[0.044] [0.044] [0.066] [0.064] [0.043]
Dfnotrade 0.0759 -0.188*** 0.242** -0.108 0.0340
[0.070] [0.067] [0.094] [0.10] [0.072]
Dnofnotrade -0.250*** -0.558*** -0.217*** -0.832*** -0.236***
[0.047] [0.041] [0.065] [0.063] [0.044]
Obs 4672 4722 3528 4672 4647
Panel B: Foreign aﬃliates with diﬀerent arms’ length trade ﬂows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Productivity Size Productivity Size Productivity
Dfimponly 0.0987* 0.0444 0.294*** 0.142* 0.0850
[0.053] [0.049] [0.077] [0.075] [0.053]
Dfexponly 0.248** 0.266** 0.441*** 0.536*** 0.302***
[0.10] [0.11] [0.13] [0.15] [0.095]
Dfimpexp 0.107 0.664*** 0.102 0.797*** 0.0664
[0.074] [0.073] [0.11] [0.10] [0.070]
Dfnotrade 0.0781 -0.187*** 0.247*** -0.104 0.0375
[0.070] [0.067] [0.094] [0.10] [0.072]
Dnofnotrade -0.249*** -0.562*** -0.209*** -0.835*** -0.233***
[0.047] [0.041] [0.065] [0.063] [0.044]
Obs 4672 4722 3528 4672 4647
Notes: OLS estimations with control variables in both panels and all columns: skill intensity, capital intensity,
input intensity, total employment, host-country, parent-location and industry dummies. Firm size regressions omit
the log of total employment as a covariate. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Productivity (column 1):
log of the ratio of total sales to total employment. Size (column 2): total employment. Productivity (column 3): log
of the ratio of value added to total employment. Size (column 4): log of total sales. Productivity (column 5): log of
total factor productivity. Panel A: Dftrade: ﬁrm is foreign-owned and has arms’ length trade only (dummy). Panel
B: Dfimport: ﬁrm is foreign-owned and has arms’ length imports only (dummy), Dfexport: ﬁrm is foreign-owned
and has arms’ length exports only (dummy), Dfimpexp: ﬁrm is foreign-owned and has arms’ length imports and
exports (dummy). Panels A and B: Dfnotrade: ﬁrm is foreign-owned and has neither intra-ﬁrm nor arms’ length
trade (dummy), Dnofnotrade: ﬁrm is domestic (i.e., not foreign-owned) and has no trade (dummy). Dummies take
value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. All variables are in logs except for dummies.
The evidence for self-selection of foreign aﬃliates into intra-ﬁrm and arm’s length
trade is similar to the evidence for self-selection of ﬁrms into aggregate trade (Bernard
et al., 2007). However, in Table 13, we show that foreign aﬃliates with trade (either
intra-ﬁrm or arms’ length trade, or both) have size but not productivity premia (Panel
A) and that the aforementioned sorting pattern is found only for size and not for
productivity (Panel B). We get very similar results when we study only manufacturing
ﬁrms (Table B22).
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Table 13: Productivity and size premia of foreign aﬃliates with trade, both intra-ﬁrm
and arms’ length trade and arms’ length trade only
Panel A: Foreign aﬃliates with trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Productivity Size Productivity Size Productivity
Dtrade 0.0957 0.403*** 0.145 0.499*** 0.142*
[0.081] [0.077] [0.11] [0.11] [0.082]
Obs 1815 1831 1348 1815 1812
Panel B: Foreign aﬃliates with diﬀerent trade ﬂows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Productivity Size Productivity Size Productivity
Dimponly 0.0373 0.226*** 0.101 0.257** 0.0613
[0.086] [0.080] [0.12] [0.12] [0.087]
Dexponly 0.176 0.371*** 0.312** 0.548*** 0.287**
[0.12] [0.11] [0.15] [0.16] [0.12]
Dimpexp 0.181* 0.766*** 0.139 0.937*** 0.242**
[0.098] [0.091] [0.14] [0.13] [0.099]
Obs 1815 1831 1348 1815 1812
Notes: OLS estimations with control variables in all panels and all columns: skill intensity, capital intensity,
input intensity, total employment, host-country, parent-location and industry dummies. Firm size regressions
omit the log of total employment as a covariate. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Productivity
(column 1): log of the ratio of total sales to total employment. Size (column 2): total employment. Produc-
tivity (column 3): log of the ratio of value added to total employment. Size (column 4): log of total sales.
Productivity (column 5): log of total factor productivity. Panel A: Dtrade: ﬁrm has imports or exports, or
both (dummy). Panel B: Dimport: ﬁrm has imports only (dummy), Dexport: ﬁrm has exports only (dummy),
Dimpexp: ﬁrm has both imports and exports (dummy). Dummies take value 1 if statement holds, and 0
otherwise. All variables are in logs except for dummies.
4.4 Summary of results and implications for the host country
We summarise the main ﬁndings of the empirical analysis as follows. Foreign aﬃliates
with intra-ﬁrm trade account for only a small fraction of all ﬁrms in the sample, and
are of larger size and higher productivity level. The ﬁrst two ﬁndings are in line with
those of Ramondo et al. (2011).
Their size premia range between 31.5% (size proxied by total number of employees)
and 56.3% (size proxied by total sales). Their productivity premia are 25.4% (ratio of
total sales to total number of employees), 25.5% (ratio of total value added to total
number of employees) and 30.7% (total factor productivity).
Our evidence for self-selection of foreign aﬃliates into diﬀerent intra-ﬁrm and arm’s
length trade ﬂows indicates that, on average, foreign aﬃliates with both intra-ﬁrm
imports and exports are the biggest and most productive ﬁrms, those with only intra-
ﬁrm exports smaller and less productive, those with only intra-ﬁrm imports even smaller
and less productive, while those with only arm’s length trade are bigger and more
productive only than those without intra-ﬁrm trade, which are the smallest and least
productive ﬁrms. Reporting these premia becomes even more important after we show
that foreign aﬃliates with only arm’s length trade diﬀer from domestic ﬁrms which
engage in international trade in terms of size and productivity. They are bigger and
more productive by 11.9% and 25.7%, respectively.
In attempt to link these ﬁndings to host-country eﬀects of FDI, the size premia
of the average foreign aﬃliate with intra-ﬁrm trade may in practice result in a higher
number of job vacancies to be ﬁlled by local job-market seekers. Its productivity premia
may imply greater productivity spillovers to local ﬁrms (e.g. supplier of inputs) with
which it develops linkages.
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5 Theoretical background
In this section we describe in detail the theoretical background of our subsequent econo-
metric analysis. Motivated by our ﬁndings in section 4 for size and productivity premia
of foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm trade, we start by providing a theoretical explanation
for the selection of foreign aﬃliates into intra-ﬁrm trade. In addition, we study theo-
retically the potential diﬀerences between foreign aﬃliates with and without intra-ﬁrm
trade in the following areas: stock and ﬂow of intangibles, delegation of authority and
grant of rights of control, extensive and intensive margins of sister aﬃliates, mode of
foreign investment of the parent company, extensive and intensive margins of local and
international procurement activities and of exporting activities.
In order to explain the selection of foreign aﬃliates into intra-ﬁrm and arm’s length
trade, we rely on the concept of ﬁrm heterogeneity in terms of productivity introduced
by Melitz (2003). We plausibly assume that the ﬁxed cost of engaging in intra-ﬁrm
trade is greater than the ﬁxed cost of engaging in arm’s length trade since the ﬁrst
includes the cost of set-up of a new aﬃliate or the takeover of an existing ﬁrm, while
the second the cost of search and match with an unaﬃliated supplier or buyer (Antras
and Helpman, 2004). Although the ﬁrst ﬁxed cost is initially borne by the parent
company which is in charge of building a network of domestic and foreign aﬃliates, we
assume that this cost is shared with its aﬃliates through intra-ﬁrm trade.
In sum, we plausibly assume that the ﬁxed cost of selling in or buying from the host-
country market is lower than the ﬁxed cost of arm’s length trade, which in turn, is lower
than the ﬁxed cost of intra-ﬁrm trade (fD < farmt < fift). The productivity cutoﬀs
above which a ﬁrm can incur each of these ﬁxed costs have the following order: (ΘD <
Θarmt < Θift). Hence, only the most productive foreign aﬃliates, with productivity
level of at least Θift are able to engage in intra-ﬁrm trade. Those with intermediate
levels of productivity (Θarmt ≤ Θ < Θift) engage in arm’s length trade, while those
with lower productivity levels (ΘD ≤ Θ < Θarmt) only sell in or buy from the host
country. Foreign aﬃliates with productivity below ΘD exit the market.
After decomposing intra-ﬁrm trade into diﬀerent ﬂows (i.e., imports, exports, both),
we assume the following order for their ﬁxed costs: fifim < fifex < fifimex = fifim +
fifex. Similarly the order of their corresponding productivity cutoﬀs are: Θifim <
Θifex < Θifimex. Eventually, the following sorting pattern arises: the biggest and most
productive foreign aﬃliates engage in both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports, smaller and
less productive in intra-ﬁrm exports, even smaller and even less productive in intra-
ﬁrm imports, while among those whose size and productivity do not allow them to
engage in any type of intra-ﬁrm trade, the biggest and most productive have only arm’s
length trade, smaller and less productive only sell into and source from the host-country
market and the least productive exit.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we juxtapose the main ﬁrm characteristics between foreign aﬃliates with
and without intra-ﬁrm trade located in 19 countries in sub-Saharan Africa in 2010.
Foreign aﬃliates with intra-ﬁrm trade are relatively few, of bigger size and higher
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productivity level. We report size and productivity premia of 31.5% and 25.4%, respec-
tively. The ﬁrst two ﬁndings are in line with those of Ramondo et al. (2011). Further
analysis reveals that foreign aﬃliates self-select into intra-ﬁrm and arm’s length trade.
On average, foreign aﬃliates with both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports seem to be the
biggest and most productive ﬁrms, those with only intra-ﬁrm exports smaller and less
productive, those with only intra-ﬁrm imports even smaller and less productive, while
those with only arm’s length trade are bigger and more productive only than those
without intra-ﬁrm trade, which are the smallest and least productive ﬁrms.
After linking these ﬁndings to the debate on host-country eﬀects of FDI, we argue
that the greater size of the average foreign aﬃliate with intra-ﬁrm trade can be trans-
lated into a greater number of job opportunities for local job-market seekers. Moreover,
any productivity spillovers to local ﬁrms may be higher when these ﬁrms develop link-
ages with the same type of foreign aﬃliate.
Despite the novelty of all results set out above, some intriguing issues can be studied
in more depth while others remain unexplored. First, the time dimension would allow
for studying causality and therefore, shed more light on the positive link between intra-
ﬁrm trade and size and productivity.
Second, given the popularity of arm’s length trade among the foreign aﬃliates in our
sample, even among those with intra-ﬁrm trade, upon data availability on transactions
between buyers and sellers by product, further investigation of the boundaries of the
ﬁrm would be desirable.
Finally, even if ﬁrm boundaries mainly exist for the transfer of intangibles rather
than of tangible goods (Atalay et al., 2014), which may be a plausible explanation
for our evidence on the scarcity of intra-ﬁrm trade, a complementary question arises.
Given the strong link between production sharing and knowledge ﬂows (Demsetz, 1988;
Simon, 1991; Grant, 1996), are there any diﬀerences between foreign aﬃliates with and
without intra-ﬁrm trade in terms of knowledge transfers to them from their parent? By
deﬁnition, the ﬁrst type of foreign aﬃliate share production with its parent, while the
second, either does not share production or it shares with an aﬃliated party. In the
last case, knowledge associated with production sharing ﬂows through the market and
may be subject to ineﬃciencies that are mitigated within ﬁrm boundaries. Thus, the
internalisation argument is present again. In addition, if there are indeed any diﬀerences
between the two ﬁrm types in this respect, then one would expect that their concerns
over knowledge expropriation from unaﬃliated parties (e.g. local suppliers in the host
country) could potentially diﬀer as well. Blanas and Seric (2014) look into these two
novel and intriguing issues.
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Table 14: Description of variables
Variable Description
Dift the ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm trade (imports, exports, or both) (dummy)
Difim the ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports (dummy)
Difex the ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm exports (dummy)
Difimex the ﬁrm has both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports (dummy)
skillInt log of skill intensity
capInt log of capital intensity
numEmp log of total number of employees (ﬁrm size)
wageEmp log of wage per employee
labProd log of labour productivity
tfp log of total factor productivity
inpInt log of input intensity
Dtraining the ﬁrm provides formal internal and/or external training to its employees (dummy)
Difimonly the ﬁrm has only intra-ﬁrm imports (dummy)
Difexonly the ﬁrm has only intra-ﬁrm exports (dummy)
Darmt the ﬁrm has only arms’ length trade (dummy)
Dftrade the ﬁrm is foreign-owned and has arms’ length trade only (dummy)
Dfnotrade ﬁrm is foreign-owned and has neither intra-ﬁrm nor arms’ length trade (dummy)
Dnofnotrade ﬁrm is domestic (i.e., not foreign-owned) and has no trade (dummy)
Dfimponly the ﬁrm is foreign-owned and has arms’ length imports only (dummy)
Dfexponly the ﬁrm is foreign-owned and has arms’ length exports only (dummy)
Dfimpexp ﬁrm is foreign-owned and has arms’ length imports and exports (dummy)
Dtrade ﬁrm has trade (imports, exports, or both) (dummy)
Dimponly ﬁrm has only imports (dummy)
Dexponly ﬁrm has only exports (dummy)
Dimpexp ﬁrm has both imports and exports (dummy)
DcapUnderLowDem main reason for production capacity under-utilisation: low demand (dummy)
firmAge ﬁrm age
DcapUnderUnrelSupply
main reason for production capacity under-utilisation: unreliable supply of production inputs (raw materials and supplies)
(dummy)
DcapUnderLackSkill main reason for production capacity under-utilisation: lack of skilled workers (dummy)
DcapUnderLackWC main reason for production capacity under-utilisation: lack of working capital/credit (dummy)
DcapUnderLabMarReg main reason for production capacity under-utilisation: labour market regulations (dummy)
DcapUnderLackTech main reason for production capacity under-utilisation: lack of specialised technology, machinery and spare-parts (dummy)
DcapUnderNo main reason for production capacity under-utilisation: production capacity not under-utilised (dummy)
DperfOvBCWellBelow company’s performance is well below overall expectations for this company before the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy)
DperfOvBCBelow company’s performance is below overall expectations for this company before the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy)
DperfOvBCInLine company’s performance is in line with overall expectations for this company before the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy)
DperfOvBCAbove company’s performance is above overall expectations for this company before the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy)
DperfOvBCWellAbove company’s performance is well above overall expectations for this company before the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy)
DperfOvACWellBelow company’s performance is well below revised expectations for this company after the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy)
DperfOvACBelow company’s performance is below revised expectations for this company after the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy)
DperfOvACInLine company’s performance is in line with revised expectations for this company after the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy)
DperfOvACAbove company’s performance is above revised expectations for this company after the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy)
DperfOvACWellAbove company’s performance is well above revised expectations for this company after the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy)
DcapUtilNoChange no change in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy)
DcapUtilDec decrease in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy)
DcapUtilInc increase in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy)
DcapUtilNoChangeHM no change in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial crisis (higher mean values) (dummy)
DcapUtilDecHM decrease in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial crisis (higher mean values) (dummy)
DcapUtilIncHM increase in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial crisis (higher mean values) (dummy)
DcapUtilNoChange10T no change in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial crisis (10% tolerance) (dummy)
DcapUtilDec10T decrease in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial crisis (10% tolerance) (dummy)
DcapUtilInc10T increase in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial crisis (10% tolerance) (dummy)
DcapUtilNoChange20T no change in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial crisis (20% tolerance) (dummy)
DcapUtilDec20T decrease in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial crisis (20% tolerance) (dummy)
DcapUtilInc20T increase in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial crisis (20% tolerance) (dummy)
DcapUtilNoChange30T no change in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial crisis (30% tolerance) (dummy)
DcapUtilDec30T decrease in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial crisis (30% tolerance) (dummy)
DcapUtilInc30T increase in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial crisis (30% tolerance) (dummy)
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Figure A1: Density of foreign aﬃliates by total sales
Figure A2: Foreign aﬃliates by total sales in percentiles
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Figure A3: Density of foreign aﬃliates by total value added to total employment
Figure A4: Foreign aﬃliates by total value added to total employment in percentiles
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Figure A5: Density of foreign aﬃliates by total factor productivity
Figure A6: Foreign aﬃliates by total factor productivity in percentiles
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B Appendix: Robustness checks
Table B1: Main characteristics (Manufacturing sector)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dift Dift Dift Difex Difim Difimex
skillInt -0.0153 -0.0198 -0.0169 -0.00840 -0.00241 -0.00102
[0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.0086] [0.012] [0.0050]
capInt -0.00580 -0.00667 -0.00113 -0.00179 -0.00351 -0.000100
[0.0077] [0.0076] [0.0075] [0.0050] [0.0065] [0.0029]
numEmp 0.0476*** 0.0283** 0.0352*** 0.0232*** 0.0146***
[0.010] [0.012] [0.0069] [0.0087] [0.0041]
wageEmp 0.0170 0.0148 0.0147 0.000245 0.0178* 0.00267
[0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.0075] [0.0100] [0.0044]
labProd 0.0332*** 0.0231*** 0.0216** 0.0109**
[0.0099] [0.0071] [0.0087] [0.0048]
inpInt 0.00442 0.00132 0.00278 -0.00233 0.00739 0.00205
[0.0080] [0.0075] [0.0079] [0.0052] [0.0072] [0.0033]
Dtraining (d) 0.0219 0.0241 0.0187 -0.0126 0.0355* -0.00395
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.014] [0.019] [0.0088]
totSales 0.0403***
[0.0072]
tfp 0.0394***
[0.010]
Obs 1581 1581 1580 1247 1555 940
Pseudo−R2 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.28 0.17 0.30
Log − likelihood -730.0 -730.5 -728.1 -382.1 -644.2 -194.0
Notes: Probit estimations with host-country, parent-location and industry dummies in all columns. Standard errors are
clustered at the ﬁrm level. The sample includes ﬁrms in manufacturing only. In column (2) total employment is replaced
by total sales while dropping labour productivity to avoid mutlicollinearity. In column (2) labour productivity is replaced by
total factor productivity. Dift: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports or exports, or both (dummy), Difex: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm exports
(dummy), Difim: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports (dummy), Difimex: ﬁrm has both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports (dummy),
skillInt: skill intensity, capInt: capital intensity, numEmp: ﬁrm size (total number of employees), numEmp: ﬁrm size (total
sales), wageEmp: wage per employee, labProd: labour productivity, tfp: total factor productivity, inpInt: input intensity,
Dtraining : ﬁrm provides formal internal/external training to its employees (dummy). Dummies take value 1 if the statement
holds, and 0 otherwise. (d): discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. All variables are in logs except for dummies.
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Table B2: Main characteristics (Whole economy - Majority-owned foreign aﬃliates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dift Dift Dift Difex Difim Difimex
skillInt -0.0253* -0.0274* -0.0260* -0.0116 -0.0107 -0.00703
[0.015] [0.014] [0.015] [0.0085] [0.013] [0.011]
capInt -0.00335 -0.00375 0.00200 -0.00266 -0.00198 -0.00367
[0.0082] [0.0082] [0.0081] [0.0050] [0.0069] [0.0063]
numEmp 0.0452*** 0.0254** 0.0313*** 0.0197** 0.0245***
[0.011] [0.013] [0.0074] [0.0095] [0.0083]
wageEmp 0.0156 0.0144 0.0149 0.00326 0.0181* 0.0116
[0.013] [0.012] [0.013] [0.0074] [0.011] [0.010]
labProd 0.0385*** 0.0215*** 0.0242*** 0.0221**
[0.011] [0.0072] [0.0092] [0.010]
inpInt 0.00214 0.000702 0.00168 -0.00225 0.00568 0.00305
[0.0084] [0.0079] [0.0084] [0.0051] [0.0076] [0.0066]
Dtraining (d) 0.0279 0.0289 0.0249 -0.0100 0.0425** -0.00569
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.014] [0.021] [0.019]
totSales 0.0418***
[0.0078]
tfp 0.0415***
[0.011]
Obs 1384 1384 1383 1045 1364 566
Pseudo−R2 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.31 0.19 0.28
Log − likelihood -625.8 -625.9 -624.9 -313.9 -558.7 -149.1
Notes: Probit estimations with host-country, parent-location and industry dummies in all columns. Standard errors are
clustered at the ﬁrm level. The sample includes only majority-owned foreign aﬃliates (i.e., aﬃliates owned by the parent
company by at least 50%) in the whole economy. In column (2) total employment is replaced by total sales while dropping
labour productivity to avoid mutlicollinearity. In column (3) labour productivity is replaced by total factor productivity. Dift:
ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports or exports, or both (dummy), Difex: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm exports (dummy), Difim: ﬁrm has intra-
ﬁrm imports (dummy), Difimex: ﬁrm has both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports (dummy), skillInt: skill intensity, capInt:
capital intensity, numEmp: ﬁrm size (total number of employees), numEmp: ﬁrm size (total sales), wageEmp: wage per
employee, labProd: labour productivity, tfp: total factor productivity, inpInt: input intensity, Dtraining : ﬁrm provides formal
internal/external training to its employees (dummy). Dummies take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. (d):
discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. All variables are in logs except for dummies.
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Table B3: Main characteristics (Manufacturing sector - Majority-owned foreign aﬃli-
ates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(7)
Dift Dift Dift Difex Difim Difimex
skillInt -0.0406 -0.0395 -0.0424* -0.0197 -0.0180 -0.00773
[0.025] [0.024] [0.025] [0.017] [0.021] [0.011]
capInt 0.0197 0.0200 0.0266* 0.00573 0.00857 -0.00409
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.0097] [0.013] [0.0064]
numEmp 0.0517*** 0.0222 0.0597*** 0.00468 0.0189**
[0.019] [0.022] [0.014] [0.016] [0.0094]
wageEmp 0.0280 0.0289 0.0261 0.0155 0.0214 0.0105
[0.021] [0.020] [0.021] [0.016] [0.017] [0.011]
labProd 0.0563** 0.0424** 0.0303 0.0276**
[0.022] [0.017] [0.020] [0.012]
inpInt -0.0195 -0.0181 -0.0208 -0.0207 0.00627 -0.00189
[0.018] [0.015] [0.017] [0.013] [0.015] [0.0068]
Dtraining (d) 0.0493 0.0490 0.0476 0.00748 0.0615* 0.0147
[0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.028] [0.033] [0.020]
totSales 0.0537***
[0.014]
tfp 0.0639***
[0.021]
Obs 721 721 719 656 715 433
Pseudo−R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.19 0.32
Log − likelihood -368.5 -368.6 -367.2 -245.4 -311.2 -106.2
Notes: Linear probability estimations with host-country, parent-location and industry dummies in all columns. Standard
errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. The sample includes only majority-owned foreign aﬃliates (i.e., aﬃliates owned by the
parent company by at least 50%) in manufacturing. In column (2) total employment is replaced by total sales while dropping
labour productivity to avoid mutlicollinearity. In column (3) labour productivity is replaced by total factor productivity.
Dift: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports or exports, or both (dummy), Difex: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm exports (dummy), Difim: ﬁrm
has intra-ﬁrm imports (dummy), Difimex: ﬁrm has both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports (dummy), skillInt: skill intensity,
capInt: capital intensity, numEmp: ﬁrm size (total number of employees), numEmp: ﬁrm size (total sales), wageEmp:
wage per employee, labProd: labour productivity, tfp: total factor productivity, inpInt: input intensity, Dtraining : ﬁrm
provides formal internal/external training to its employees (dummy). Dummies take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0
otherwise. (d): discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. All variables are in logs except for dummies.
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Table B4: Main characteristics (Drop missing observations of intra-ﬁrm trade)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dift Dift Dift Difex Difim Difimex
skillInt -0.0255 -0.0220 -0.0293 -0.0279 0.00838 0.00978
[0.033] [0.031] [0.034] [0.033] [0.028] [0.022]
capInt -0.00830 -0.00741 0.00363 -0.0394** 0.0116 -0.0134
[0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.015] [0.012]
numEmp 0.0667** 0.0238 0.0880*** 0.0338 0.0516***
[0.026] [0.028] [0.026] [0.022] [0.019]
wageEmp 0.0364 0.0379 0.0361 0.0302 0.0399 0.0273
[0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.030] [0.026] [0.022]
labProd 0.0769*** 0.0879*** 0.0458* 0.0488**
[0.027] [0.026] [0.024] [0.020]
inpInt -0.0265 -0.0236 -0.0350 -0.0190 -0.00308 0.00717
[0.021] [0.020] [0.021] [0.021] [0.017] [0.012]
Dtraining (d) -0.0462 -0.0470 -0.0529 -0.0873 0.0373 -0.0136
[0.053] [0.053] [0.053] [0.054] [0.048] [0.041]
totSales 0.0713***
[0.019]
tfp 0.101***
[0.026]
Obs 493 493 493 473 461 393
Pseudo−R2 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.25
Log − likelihood -282.9 -283.0 -280.0 -246.8 -230.7 -146.0
Notes: Probit estimations with host-country, parent-location and industry dummies in all columns. Standard errors are
clustered at the ﬁrm level. In column (2) total employment is replaced by total sales while dropping labour productivity
to avoid mutlicollinearity. In column (3) labour productivity is replaced by total factor productivity. Dift: ﬁrm has intra-
ﬁrm imports or exports, or both (dummy), Difex: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm exports (dummy), Difim: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports
(dummy), Difimex: ﬁrm has both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports (dummy), skillInt: skill intensity, capInt: capital intensity,
numEmp: ﬁrm size (total number of employees), numEmp: ﬁrm size (total sales), wageEmp: wage per employee, labProd:
labour productivity, tfp: total factor productivity, inpInt: input intensity, Dtraining : ﬁrm provides formal internal/external
training to its employees (dummy). Dummies take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. (d): discrete change of
dummy variable from 0 to 1. All variables are in logs except for dummies.
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Table B5: Main characteristics (Drop missing observations of intra-ﬁrm trade - Manu-
facturing)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dift Dift Dift Difex Difim Difimex
skillInt -0.0197 -0.0160 -0.0228 -0.0187 0.00128 0.00663
[0.038] [0.036] [0.038] [0.037] [0.032] [0.022]
capInt 0.00227 0.00318 0.0107 -0.0448** 0.0173 -0.0187*
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.020] [0.018] [0.011]
numEmp 0.0625** 0.0203 0.0905*** 0.0210 0.0424**
[0.031] [0.033] [0.031] [0.028] [0.021]
wageEmp 0.0461 0.0481 0.0461 0.0488 0.0355 0.0208
[0.034] [0.033] [0.034] [0.036] [0.029] [0.021]
labProd 0.0750** 0.0916*** 0.0568** 0.0562***
[0.033] [0.032] [0.029] [0.020]
inpInt -0.0514* -0.0478* -0.0562** -0.0370 -0.0274 -0.0102
[0.028] [0.025] [0.028] [0.026] [0.021] [0.012]
Dtraining (d) -0.00647 -0.00763 -0.00593 -0.0455 0.0662 0.0152
[0.059] [0.059] [0.059] [0.060] [0.055] [0.039]
totSales 0.0681***
[0.023]
tfp 0.0935***
[0.031]
Obs 401 401 401 382 366 306
Pseudo−R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.29
Log − likelihood -226.6 -226.6 -225.0 -191.5 -177.9 -101.1
Notes: Probit estimations with host-country, parent-location and industry dummies in all columns. Standard errors are
clustered at the ﬁrm level. The sample includes ﬁrms in manufacturing only. In column (2) total employment is replaced
by total sales while dropping labour productivity to avoid mutlicollinearity. In column (3) labour productivity is replaced
by total factor productivity. Dift: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports or exports, or both (dummy), Difex: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm
exports (dummy), Difim: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports (dummy), Difimex: ﬁrm has both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports
(dummy), skillInt: skill intensity, capInt: capital intensity, numEmp: ﬁrm size (total number of employees), numEmp:
ﬁrm size (total sales), wageEmp: wage per employee, labProd: labour productivity, tfp: total factor productivity, inpInt:
input intensity, Dtraining : ﬁrm provides formal internal/external training to its employees (dummy). Dummies take value 1
if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. (d): discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. All variables are in logs except
for dummies.
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Table B6: Main characteristics (Drop missing observations of intra-ﬁrm trade - MOFAs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dift Dift Dift Difex Difim Difimex
skillInt -0.0532 -0.0502 -0.0595 -0.0501 -0.00210 -0.00117
[0.037] [0.034] [0.038] [0.036] [0.032] [0.023]
capInt -0.00968 -0.00880 0.00189 -0.0383* -0.000918 -0.0257**
[0.020] [0.019] [0.019] [0.020] [0.017] [0.013]
numEmp 0.0669** 0.0227 0.0850*** 0.0233 0.0442**
[0.029] [0.031] [0.028] [0.026] [0.020]
wageEmp 0.0601* 0.0614* 0.0588* 0.0516 0.0512* 0.0413*
[0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.030] [0.024]
labProd 0.0757*** 0.0856*** 0.0431* 0.0503**
[0.029] [0.029] [0.026] [0.020]
inpInt -0.0200 -0.0177 -0.0345 -0.0118 -0.00227 0.00571
[0.023] [0.021] [0.023] [0.022] [0.019] [0.012]
Dtraining (d) -0.0106 -0.0114 -0.0214 -0.0657 0.0592 0.00349
[0.058] [0.058] [0.059] [0.057] [0.054] [0.044]
totSales 0.0710***
[0.021]
tfp 0.113***
[0.028]
Obs 418 418 418 411 373 318
Pseudo−R2 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.15 0.26
Log − likelihood -236.2 -236.3 -232.2 -210.8 -194.8 -118.9
Notes: Probit estimations with host-country, parent-location and industry dummies in all columns. Standard errors are
clustered at the ﬁrm level. The sample includes only majority-owned foreign aﬃliates (i.e., aﬃliates owned by the parent
company by at least 50%) in the whole economy. In column (2) total employment is replaced by total sales while dropping
labour productivity to avoid mutlicollinearity. In column (3) labour productivity is replaced by total factor productivity.
Dift: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports or exports, or both (dummy), Difex: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm exports (dummy), Difim: ﬁrm
has intra-ﬁrm imports (dummy), Difimex: ﬁrm has both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports (dummy), skillInt: skill intensity,
capInt: capital intensity, numEmp: ﬁrm size (total number of employees), numEmp: ﬁrm size (total sales), wageEmp: wage
per employee, labProd: labour productivity, tfp: total factor productivity, inpInt: input intensity, Dtraining : ﬁrm provides
formal internal/external training to its employees (dummy). Dummies take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise.
(d): discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. All variables are in logs except for dummies.
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Table B7: Main characteristics (Drop missing observations of intra-ﬁrm trade - MOFAs
in Manufacturing)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6))
Dift Dift Dift Difex Difim Difimex
skillInt -0.0563 -0.0522 -0.0618 -0.0504 -0.0159 -0.00887
[0.042] [0.040] [0.042] [0.039] [0.036] [0.020]
capInt 0.00247 0.00363 0.00839 -0.0414** 0.00870 -0.0267**
[0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.020] [0.021] [0.011]
numEmp 0.0490 0.00857 0.0745** -0.0111 0.0238
[0.035] [0.037] [0.033] [0.033] [0.022]
wageEmp 0.0788* 0.0814** 0.0750* 0.0807* 0.0494 0.0367*
[0.042] [0.040] [0.042] [0.042] [0.034] [0.021]
labProd 0.0636* 0.0779** 0.0470 0.0531***
[0.034] [0.033] [0.033] [0.020]
inpInt -0.0343 -0.0301 -0.0470 -0.0148 -0.0162 0.00417
[0.029] [0.026] [0.029] [0.026] [0.023] [0.011]
Dtraining (d) 0.0439 0.0422 0.0415 -0.0114 0.109* 0.0407
[0.065] [0.065] [0.065] [0.063] [0.060] [0.040]
totSales 0.0558**
[0.025]
tfp 0.0976***
[0.033]
Obs 336 336 336 330 297 252
Pseudo−R2 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.19 0.32
Log − likelihood -187.0 -187.1 -184.6 -162.7 -146.5 -80.0
Notes: Probit estimations with host-country, parent-location and industry dummies in all columns. Standard errors are
clustered at the ﬁrm level. The sample includes only majority-owned foreign aﬃliates (i.e., aﬃliates owned by the parent
company by at least 50%) in manufacturing. In column (2) total employment is replaced by total sales while dropping
labour productivity to avoid mutlicollinearity. In column (3) labour productivity is replaced by total factor productivity.
Dift: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports or exports, or both (dummy), Difex: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm exports (dummy), Difim:
ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports (dummy), Difimex: ﬁrm has both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports (dummy), skillInt: skill
intensity, capInt: capital intensity, numEmp: ﬁrm size (total number of employees), numEmp: ﬁrm size (total sales),
wageEmp: wage per employee, labProd: labour productivity, tfp: total factor productivity, inpInt: input intensity,
Dtraining : ﬁrm provides formal internal/external training to its employees (dummy). Dummies take value 1 if the
statement holds, and 0 otherwise. (d): discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. All variables are in logs except
for dummies.
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Table B8: Main characteristics (control for ﬁrm age)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dift Dift Dift Difex Difim Difimex
skillInt -0.0148 -0.0195 -0.0164 -0.00915 -0.00198 -0.00161
[0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.0086] [0.012] [0.0050]
capInt -0.00616 -0.00710 -0.00152 -0.00233 -0.00371 -0.000514
[0.0077] [0.0076] [0.0076] [0.0050] [0.0065] [0.0029]
numEmp 0.0479*** 0.0289** 0.0327*** 0.0239*** 0.0127***
[0.011] [0.012] [0.0069] [0.0090] [0.0041]
wageEmp 0.0173 0.0148 0.0150 -0.000688 0.0181* 0.00216
[0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.0075] [0.010] [0.0044]
labProd 0.0329*** 0.0228*** 0.0215** 0.0105**
[0.0100] [0.0071] [0.0087] [0.0047]
inpInt 0.00489 0.00175 0.00314 -0.00207 0.00760 0.00217
[0.0080] [0.0075] [0.0079] [0.0052] [0.0072] [0.0032]
Dtraining (d) 0.0222 0.0243 0.0190 -0.0126 0.0356* -0.00380
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.014] [0.019] [0.0087]
firmAge -0.00321 -0.0000734 -0.00464 0.0122 -0.00521 0.00930
[0.017] [0.016] [0.017] [0.010] [0.014] [0.0063]
totSales 0.0401***
[0.0073]
tfp 0.0394***
[0.010]
Obs 1575 1575 1574 1244 1549 938
Pseudo−R2 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.29 0.17 0.30
Log − likelihood -728.2 -728.7 -726.3 -380.8 -643.0 -192.8
Notes: Probit estimations with host-country, parent-location and industry dummies in all columns. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the ﬁrm level. In column (2) total employment is replaced by total sales while dropping labour productivity to avoid
mutlicollinearity. In column (3) labour productivity is replaced by total factor productivity. Dift: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports or
exports, or both (dummy), Difex: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm exports (dummy), Difim: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports (dummy), Difimex:
ﬁrm has both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports (dummy), skillInt: skill intensity, capInt: capital intensity, numEmp: ﬁrm size
(total number of employees), numEmp: ﬁrm size (total sales), wageEmp: wage per employee, labProd: labour productivity,
tfp: total factor productivity, inpInt: input intensity, Dtraining : ﬁrm provides formal internal/external training to its employees
(dummy). Dummies take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. (d): discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
All variables are in logs except for dummies.
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Table B9: Main characteristics (logit model)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dift Dift Dift Difex Difim Difimex
skillInt -0.103 -0.130 -0.114 -0.126 -0.0296 -0.00604
[0.089] [0.085] [0.089] [0.12] [0.098] [0.17]
capInt -0.0387 -0.0443 -0.0108 -0.0196 -0.0298 0.00740
[0.049] [0.048] [0.048] [0.074] [0.053] [0.11]
numEmp 0.289*** 0.170** 0.495*** 0.181*** 0.523***
[0.066] [0.074] [0.095] [0.070] [0.13]
wageEmp 0.104 0.0884 0.0878 0.0181 0.136* 0.128
[0.076] [0.074] [0.077] [0.11] [0.081] [0.17]
labProd 0.201*** 0.328*** 0.164** 0.380**
[0.064] [0.11] [0.070] [0.18]
inpInt 0.0268 0.00805 0.0153 -0.0418 0.0606 0.0526
[0.050] [0.047] [0.050] [0.075] [0.058] [0.11]
Dtraining 0.138 0.152 0.116 -0.181 0.280* -0.0906
[0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.21] [0.16] [0.31]
totSales 0.246***
[0.045]
tfp 0.245***
[0.065]
Obs 1581 1581 1580 1247 1555 940
Pseudo−R2 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.29 0.17 0.31
Log − likelihood -730.1 -730.6 -728.0 -380.6 -644.5 -191.8
Notes: Logit estimations with host-country, parent-location and industry dummies in all columns. Standard errors
are clustered at the ﬁrm level. In column (2) total employment is replaced by total sales while dropping labour
productivity to avoid mutlicollinearity. In column (3) labour productivity is replaced by total factor productivity.
Dift: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports or exports, or both (dummy), Difex: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm exports (dummy), Difim:
ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports (dummy), Difimex: ﬁrm has both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports (dummy), skillInt: skill
intensity, capInt: capital intensity, numEmp: ﬁrm size (total number of employees), numEmp: ﬁrm size (total sales),
wageEmp: wage per employee, labProd: labour productivity, tfp: total factor productivity, inpInt: input intensity,
Dtraining : ﬁrm provides formal internal/external training to its employees (dummy), firmAge: ﬁrm age. Dummies
take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. (d): discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. All variables
are in logs except for dummies.
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Table B10: Main characteristics (linear probability model)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dift Dift Dift Difex Difim Difimex
skillInt -0.00860 -0.0134 -0.00994 -0.00577 0.000543 0.00337
[0.013] [0.012] [0.013] [0.0093] [0.012] [0.0072]
capInt -0.00773 -0.00840 -0.00358 -0.00287 -0.00668 -0.00182
[0.0070] [0.0070] [0.0069] [0.0052] [0.0067] [0.0040]
numEmp 0.0432*** 0.0269** 0.0353*** 0.0258*** 0.0179***
[0.0096] [0.011] [0.0070] [0.0090] [0.0053]
wageEmp 0.0143 0.0120 0.0116 0.000178 0.0169* 0.00275
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.0086] [0.010] [0.0066]
labProd 0.0281*** 0.0176*** 0.0201** 0.00963**
[0.0085] [0.0059] [0.0082] [0.0047]
inpInt 0.00618 0.00337 0.00469 -0.000732 0.00984 0.00292
[0.0073] [0.0071] [0.0073] [0.0054] [0.0074] [0.0048]
Dtraining 0.0138 0.0160 0.0116 -0.0237 0.0311 -0.00637
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.016] [0.021] [0.011]
totSales 0.0353***
[0.0063]
tfp 0.0335***
[0.0086]
Obs 1741 1741 1740 1741 1741 1741
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.077
Notes: Linear Probability estimations with host-country, parent-location and industry dummies in all columns. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. In column (2) total employment is replaced by total sales while dropping
labour productivity to avoid mutlicollinearity. In column (3) labour productivity is replaced by total factor productivity.
Dift: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports or exports, or both (dummy), Difex: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm exports (dummy), Difim:
ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports (dummy), Difimex: ﬁrm has both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports (dummy), skillInt: skill
intensity, capInt: capital intensity, numEmp: ﬁrm size (total number of employees), numEmp: ﬁrm size (total sales),
wageEmp: wage per employee, labProd: labour productivity, tfp: total factor productivity, inpInt: input intensity,
Dtraining : ﬁrm provides formal internal/external training to its employees (dummy). Dummies take value 1 if the
statement holds, and 0 otherwise. (d): discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. All variables are in logs except
for dummies.
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Table B11: Main characteristics (dummies for parent located in HI, non-SSA LMI, SSA
countries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dift Dift Dift Difex Difim Difimex
skillInt -0.0122 -0.0178 -0.0133 -0.00254 -0.00200 0.00349
[0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.0082] [0.012] [0.0050]
capInt -0.00329 -0.00440 0.00115 -0.00167 -0.00212 0.0000504
[0.0075] [0.0074] [0.0073] [0.0049] [0.0065] [0.0028]
numEmp 0.0480*** 0.0310*** 0.0369*** 0.0255*** 0.0158***
[0.010] [0.011] [0.0064] [0.0087] [0.0039]
wageEmp 0.0217* 0.0193* 0.0196* 0.00517 0.0203** 0.00476
[0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.0072] [0.0098] [0.0045]
labProd 0.0310*** 0.0226*** 0.0192** 0.00866**
[0.0099] [0.0067] [0.0087] [0.0044]
inpInt 0.00463 0.00104 0.00391 -0.00235 0.00876 0.00258
[0.0078] [0.0075] [0.0077] [0.0048] [0.0070] [0.0031]
Dtraining (d) 0.0313 0.0341 0.0291 -0.00967 0.0452** 0.00235
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.013] [0.019] [0.0084]
totSales 0.0396***
[0.0069]
tfp 0.0352***
[0.0099]
Obs 1639 1639 1638 1383 1639 1208
Pseudo−R2 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.22 0.11 0.21
Log − likelihood -805.1 -805.8 -804.0 -431.2 -715.6 -236.0
Notes: Probit estimations with host-country, parent-location and industry dummies in all columns. Parent location: high-
income country, non-SSA low/middle-income country, SSA country. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. In column
(2) total employment is replaced by total sales while dropping labour productivity to avoid mutlicollinearity. In column (3)
labour productivity is replaced by total factor productivity. Dift: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports or exports, or both (dummy),
Difex: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm exports (dummy), Difim: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports (dummy), Difimex: ﬁrm has both intra-
ﬁrm imports and exports (dummy), skillInt: skill intensity, capInt: capital intensity, numEmp: ﬁrm size (total number of
employees), numEmp: ﬁrm size (total sales), wageEmp: wage per employee, labProd: labour productivity, tfp: total factor
productivity, inpInt: input intensity, Dtraining : ﬁrm provides formal internal/external training to its employees (dummy).
Dummies take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. (d): discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. All variables
are in logs except for dummies.
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Table B12: Main characteristics (dummies for pairs of host countries and industries)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dift Dift Dift Difex Difim Difimex
skillInt -0.0278 -0.0370 -0.0316 0.00154 -0.0170 0.0105
[0.025] [0.024] [0.025] [0.026] [0.023] [0.020]
capInt -0.00270 -0.00470 0.00452 0.00516 0.000319 0.00681
[0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.015] [0.012] [0.012]
numEmp 0.0764*** 0.0456** 0.100*** 0.0380** 0.0684***
[0.018] [0.019] [0.020] [0.016] [0.015]
wageEmp 0.0186 0.0149 0.0147 -0.00766 0.0307* 0.0243
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.023] [0.018] [0.016]
labProd 0.0512*** 0.0355* 0.0375** 0.0171
[0.017] [0.021] [0.017] [0.019]
inpInt 0.0141 0.00899 0.0113 0.0183 0.00999 0.0130
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.016] [0.012] [0.012]
Dtraining (d) 0.0228 0.0259 0.0156 -0.0550 0.0690** -0.0149
[0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.039] [0.034] [0.032]
totSales 0.0634***
[0.013]
tfp 0.0619***
[0.017]
Obs 977 977 976 573 924 363
Pseudo−R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.25 0.18 0.30
Log − likelihood -522.1 -522.6 -519.3 -251.2 -452.4 -116.2
Notes: Probit estimations with dummies for parent-location and for pairs of host countries and industries in all columns.
Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. In column (2) total employment is replaced by total sales while dropping
labour productivity to avoid mutlicollinearity. In column (3) labour productivity is replaced by total factor productivity.
Dift: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm imports or exports, or both (dummy), Difex: ﬁrm has intra-ﬁrm exports (dummy), Difim: ﬁrm
has intra-ﬁrm imports (dummy), Difimex: ﬁrm has both intra-ﬁrm imports and exports (dummy), skillInt: skill intensity,
capInt: capital intensity, numEmp: ﬁrm size (total number of employees), numEmp: ﬁrm size (total sales), wageEmp:
wage per employee, labProd: labour productivity, tfp: total factor productivity, inpInt: input intensity, Dtraining : ﬁrm
provides formal internal/external training to its employees (dummy). Dummies take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0
otherwise. (d): discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. All variables are in logs except for dummies.
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Table B13: Production capacity under-utilisation
Dift (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
skillInt -0.0156 -0.0150 -0.0156 -0.0153 -0.0151 -0.0153 -0.0136
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
capInt -0.00579 -0.00581 -0.00563 -0.00589 -0.00592 -0.00582 -0.00609
[0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0077]
numEmp 0.0474*** 0.0476*** 0.0478*** 0.0480*** 0.0479*** 0.0476*** 0.0471***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
wageEmp 0.0169 0.0172 0.0177 0.0170 0.0172 0.0170 0.0152
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
labProd 0.0330*** 0.0334*** 0.0334*** 0.0334*** 0.0333*** 0.0332*** 0.0332***
[0.0099] [0.0099] [0.0099] [0.0099] [0.0099] [0.0099] [0.0099]
inpInt 0.00458 0.00422 0.00412 0.00440 0.00434 0.00442 0.00440
[0.0080] [0.0080] [0.0080] [0.0080] [0.0080] [0.0080] [0.0080]
Dtraining (d) 0.0206 0.0216 0.0198 0.0224 0.0217 0.0221 0.0237
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
DcapUnderLowDem (d) -0.0239
[0.024]
DcapUnderUnrelSupply (d) 0.0300
[0.037]
DcapUnderLackSkill (d) 0.0785
[0.070]
DcapUnderLackWC (d) 0.0263
[0.060]
DcapUnderLabMarReg (d) -0.0304
[0.073]
DcapUnderLackTech (d) -0.00794
[0.054]
DcapUnderNo (d) 0.0676*
[0.036]
Obs 1581 1581 1581 1581 1581 1581 1581
Pseudo−R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.21
Log − likelihood -729.6 -729.6 -729.3 -729.9 -729.9 -730.0 -728.0
Notes: Probit estimations with host-country, parent-location and industry dummies in all columns. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. See
Table 14 for a description of variables capturing main ﬁrm characteristics. DcapUnderLowDem: low demand (dummy), DcapUnderUnrelSupply : unreliable
supply of production inputs (raw materials and supplies) (dummy), DcapUnderLackSkill: lack of skilled workers (dummy), DcapUnderLackWC : lack of
working capital/credit (dummy), DcapUnderLabMarReg : labour market regulations, DcapUnderLackTech: lack of specialised technology.machinery and
spare-parts (dummy), DcapUnderNo: production capacity not under-utilised (dummy). Dummies take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise.
(d): discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. All variables are in logs except for dummies.
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Table B14: Performance before the crisis
Dift (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
skillInt -0.0155 -0.0151 -0.0146 -0.0151 -0.0155
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
capInt -0.00596 -0.00620 -0.00530 -0.00512 -0.00587
[0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0077]
numEmp 0.0478*** 0.0471*** 0.0481*** 0.0490*** 0.0475***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
wageEmp 0.0172 0.0171 0.0169 0.0172 0.0173
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
labProd 0.0333*** 0.0335*** 0.0336*** 0.0330*** 0.0327***
[0.0099] [0.0099] [0.0100] [0.0099] [0.0099]
inpInt 0.00455 0.00417 0.00456 0.00507 0.00439
[0.0080] [0.0080] [0.0080] [0.0080] [0.0080]
Dtraining (d) 0.0220 0.0216 0.0205 0.0207 0.0220
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
DperfOvBCWellBelow (d) 0.0232
[0.073]
DperfOvBCBelow (d) -0.0348
[0.034]
DperfOvBCInLine (d) 0.0248
[0.022]
DperfOvBCAbove (d) -0.0323
[0.023]
DperfOvBCWellAbove (d) 0.0363
[0.048]
Obs 1581 1581 1581 1581 1581
Pseudo−R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
Log − likelihood -730.0 -729.5 -729.4 -729.1 -729.7
Notes: Probit estimations with host-country, parent-location and industry dummies in all columns. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. See Table 14 for a description of variables capturing main ﬁrm characteristics.
DperfOvBCWellBelow: company’s performance is well below overall expectations for this company before the global
ﬁnancial crisis (dummy), DperfOvBCBelow: company’s performance is below overall expectations for this company
before the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy), DperfOvBCInLine: company’s performance is in line with overall expecta-
tions for this company before the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy), DperfOvBCAbove: company’s performance is above
overall expectations for this company before the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy), DperfOvBCWellAbove: company’s
performance is well above overall expectations for this company before the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy). Dummies
take value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. (d): discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. All variables
are in logs except for dummies.
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Table B15: Performance after the crisis
Dift (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
skillInt -0.0171 -0.0155 -0.0153 -0.0154 -0.0159
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
capInt -0.00565 -0.00567 -0.00583 -0.00582 -0.00581
[0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0077]
numEmp 0.0456*** 0.0478*** 0.0475*** 0.0478*** 0.0476***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
wageEmp 0.0169 0.0172 0.0171 0.0172 0.0168
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
labProd 0.0330*** 0.0333*** 0.0333*** 0.0335*** 0.0328***
[0.0100] [0.0099] [0.0099] [0.0099] [0.0099]
inpInt 0.00433 0.00441 0.00438 0.00434 0.00463
[0.0080] [0.0080] [0.0080] [0.0080] [0.0080]
Dtraining (d) 0.0212 0.0213 0.0219 0.0211 0.0210
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
DperfOvACWellBelow (d) -0.0797*
[0.043]
DperfOvACBelow (d) 0.0129
[0.027]
DperfOvACInLine (d) 0.00370
[0.022]
DperfOvACAbove (d) -0.0135
[0.025]
DperfOvACWellAbove (d) 0.0653
[0.071]
Obs 1581 1581 1581 1581 1581
Pseudo−R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
Log − likelihood -728.6 -729.9 -730.0 -729.9 -729.6
Notes: Probit estimations with host-country, parent-location and industry dummies in all columns. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. See Table 14 for a description of variables capturing main ﬁrm characteristics.
DperfOvACWellBelow: company’s performance is well below revised expectations for this company after the global
ﬁnancial crisis (dummy), DperfOvACBelow: company’s performance is below revised expectations for this company af-
ter the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy), DperfOvACInLine: company’s performance is in line with revised expectations
for this company after the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy), DperfOvACAbove: company’s performance is above revised
expectations for this company after the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy), DperfOvACWellAbove: company’s performance
is well above revised expectations for this company after the global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy). Dummies take value 1 if
the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. (d): discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. All variables are in logs
except for dummies.
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Table B16: Financial crisis eﬀect: change in capacity utilisation
Dift (1) (2) (3)
skillInt -0.0151 -0.0147 -0.0151
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
capInt -0.00600 -0.00586 -0.00640
[0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0077]
numEmp 0.0479*** 0.0479*** 0.0475***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
wageEmp 0.0172 0.0174 0.0170
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
labProd 0.0334*** 0.0337*** 0.0331***
[0.0099] [0.0099] [0.0100]
inpInt 0.00463 0.00406 0.00499
[0.0080] [0.0080] [0.0080]
Dtraining (d) 0.0222 0.0221 0.0222
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
DcapUtilNoChange (d) -0.0233
[0.025]
DcapUtilDec (d) 0.0242
[0.025]
DcapUtilInc (d) 0.0559
[0.049]
Obs 1581 1581 1581
Pseudo−R2 0.21 0.21 0.21
Log − likelihood -729.6 -729.5 -729.3
Notes: Probit estimations with host-country, parent-location and industry dum-
mies in all columns. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. See
Table 14 for a description of variables capturing main ﬁrm characteristics.
DcapUtilNoChange: no change in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial
crisis (dummy), DcapUtilDec: decrease in capacity utilisation after the global
ﬁnancial crisis (dummy), DcapUtilInc: increase in capacity utilisation after the
global ﬁnancial crisis (dummy). Dummies take value 1 if the statement holds, and
0 otherwise. (d): discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. All variables
are in logs except for dummies.
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Table B17: Financial crisis eﬀect: change in capacity utilisation with higher mean
values
Dift (1) (2) (3)
skillInt -0.0151 -0.0151 -0.0147
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
capInt -0.00600 -0.00640 -0.00586
[0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0077]
numEmp 0.0479*** 0.0475*** 0.0479***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
wageEmp 0.0172 0.0170 0.0174
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
labProd 0.0334*** 0.0331*** 0.0337***
[0.0099] [0.0100] [0.0099]
inpInt 0.00463 0.00499 0.00406
[0.0080] [0.0080] [0.0080]
Dtraining (d) 0.0222 0.0222 0.0221
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
DcapUtilNoChangeHM (d) -0.0233
[0.025]
DcapUtilDecHM (d) 0.0559
[0.049]
DcapUtilIncHM (d) 0.0242
[0.025]
Obs 1581 1581 1581
Pseudo−R2 0.21 0.21 0.21
Log − likelihood -729.6 -729.3 -729.5
Notes: Probit estimations with host-country, parent-location and industry dummies
in all columns. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. See Table 14 for a
description of variables capturing main ﬁrm characteristics. DcapUtilNoChangeHM :
no change in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial crisis (higher mean values)
(dummy), DcapUtilDecHM : decrease in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial
crisis (higher mean values) (dummy), DcapUtilIncHM : increase in capacity utilisation
after the global ﬁnancial crisis (higher mean values) (dummy). Dummies take value
1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. (d): discrete change of dummy variable
from 0 to 1. All variables are in logs except for dummies.
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Table B18: Financial crisis eﬀect: change in capacity utilisation with 10% tolerance
Dift (1) (2) (3)
skillInt -0.0153 -0.0150 -0.0153
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
capInt -0.00580 -0.00588 -0.00599
[0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0077]
numEmp 0.0476*** 0.0478*** 0.0476***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
wageEmp 0.0170 0.0173 0.0171
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
labProd 0.0332*** 0.0335*** 0.0331***
[0.0099] [0.0099] [0.0099]
inpInt 0.00442 0.00421 0.00459
[0.0080] [0.0080] [0.0080]
Dtraining (d) 0.0219 0.0221 0.0218
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
DcapUtilNoChange10T (d) 0.000141
[0.025]
DcapUtilDec10T (d) 0.0165
[0.025]
DcapUtilInc10T (d) 0.0218
[0.057]
Obs 1581 1581 1581
Pseudo−R2 0.20 0.21 0.21
Log − likelihood -730.0 -729.8 -730.0
Notes: Probit estimations with host-country, parent-location and industry dummies
in all columns. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. See Table 14 for a
description of variables capturing main ﬁrm characteristics. DcapUtilNoChange10T :
no change in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial crisis (10% tolerance)
(dummy), DcapUtilDec10T : decrease in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial
crisis (10% tolerance) (dummy), DcapUtilInc10T : increase in capacity utilisation after
the global ﬁnancial crisis (10% tolerance) (dummy). Dummies take value 1 if the
statement holds, and 0 otherwise. (d): discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to
1. All variables are in logs except for dummies.
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Table B19: Financial crisis eﬀect: change in capacity utilisation with 20% tolerance
Dift (1) (2) (3)
skillInt -0.0155 -0.0151 -0.0152
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
capInt -0.00582 -0.00594 -0.00593
[0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0077]
numEmp 0.0479*** 0.0483*** 0.0476***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
wageEmp 0.0174 0.0177 0.0173
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
labProd 0.0331*** 0.0334*** 0.0330***
[0.0099] [0.0099] [0.0099]
inpInt 0.00468 0.00449 0.00447
[0.0080] [0.0080] [0.0080]
Dtraining (d) 0.0218 0.0222 0.0214
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
DcapUtilNoChange20T (d) -0.0162
[0.026]
DcapUtilDec20T (d) 0.0379
[0.028]
DcapUtilInc20T (d) 0.0397
[0.080]
Obs 1581 1581 1581
Pseudo−R2 0.21 0.21 0.21
Log − likelihood -729.8 -729.1 -729.9
Notes: Probit estimations with host-country, parent-location and industry dummies
in all columns. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. See Table 14 for a
description of variables capturing main ﬁrm characteristics. DcapUtilNoChange20T :
no change in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial crisis (20% tolerance)
(dummy), DcapUtilDec20T : decrease in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial
crisis (20% tolerance) (dummy), DcapUtilInc20T : increase in capacity utilisation after
the global ﬁnancial crisis (20% tolerance) (dummy). Dummies take value 1 if the
statement holds, and 0 otherwise. (d): discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to
1. All variables are in logs except for dummies.
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Table B20: Financial crisis eﬀect: change in capacity utilisation with 30% tolerance
Dift (1) (2) (3)
skillInt -0.0149 -0.0153 -0.0152
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
capInt -0.00579 -0.00583 -0.00577
[0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0077]
numEmp 0.0473*** 0.0476*** 0.0475***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
wageEmp 0.0169 0.0171 0.0174
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
labProd 0.0334*** 0.0332*** 0.0331***
[0.0099] [0.0099] [0.0099]
inpInt 0.00417 0.00441 0.00454
[0.0080] [0.0080] [0.0080]
Dtraining (d) 0.0214 0.0220 0.0209
[0.023] [0.023] [0.023]
DcapUtilNoChange30T (d) 0.0217
[0.030]
DcapUtilDec30T (d) 0.00422
[0.036]
DcapUtilInc30T (d) 0.0908
[0.14]
Obs 1581 1581 1581
Pseudo−R2 0.21 0.20 0.21
Log − likelihood -729.8 -730.0 -729.7
Notes: Probit estimations with host-country, parent-location and industry dummies
in all columns. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. See Table 14 for a
description of variables capturing main ﬁrm characteristics. DcapUtilNoChange30T :
no change in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial crisis (30% tolerance)
(dummy), DcapUtilDec30T : decrease in capacity utilisation after the global ﬁnancial
crisis (30% tolerance) (dummy), DcapUtilInc30T : increase in capacity utilisation after
the global ﬁnancial crisis (30% tolerance) (dummy). Dummies take value 1 if the
statement holds, and 0 otherwise. (d): discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to
1. All variables are in logs except for dummies.
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Table B21: Productivity and size premia of foreign aﬃliates with arms’ length trade
over domestic ﬁrms with arms’ length trade (Manufacturing sector)
Panel A: Foreign aﬃliates with arms’ length trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Productivity Size Productivity Size Productivity
Dftrade 0.0875* 0.328*** 0.212*** 0.436*** 0.0359
[0.051] [0.060] [0.078] [0.082] [0.052]
Dfnotrade 0.0207 -0.0827 0.115 -0.0704 -0.0561
[0.082] [0.093] [0.13] [0.14] [0.090]
Dnofnotrade -0.236*** -0.613*** -0.219*** -0.886*** -0.200***
[0.068] [0.056] [0.084] [0.089] [0.060]
Obs 2372 2381 2062 2372 2349
Panel B: Foreign aﬃliates with diﬀerent arms’ length trade ﬂows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Productivity Size Productivity Size Productivity
Dfimponly 0.0911 0.0600 0.316*** 0.149 0.0310
[0.061] [0.068] [0.092] [0.098] [0.067]
Dfexponly 0.0277 0.224 0.361** 0.288 0.165*
[0.13] [0.14] [0.14] [0.20] [0.100]
Dfimpexp 0.101 0.712*** 0.0247 0.856*** 0.00181
[0.078] [0.087] [0.12] [0.12] [0.075]
Dfnotrade 0.0203 -0.0772 0.113 -0.0646 -0.0553
[0.082] [0.093] [0.13] [0.14] [0.090]
Dnofnotrade -0.236*** -0.614*** -0.211** -0.888*** -0.198***
[0.068] [0.056] [0.084] [0.089] [0.060]
Obs 2372 2381 2062 2372 2349
Notes: OLS estimations with control variables in both panels and all columns: skill intensity, capital intensity,
input intensity, total employment, host-country, parent-location and industry dummies. Firm size regressions omit
the log of total employment as a covariate. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Productivity (column 1):
log of the ratio of total sales to total employment. Size (column 2): total employment. Productivity (column 3): log
of the ratio of value added to total employment. Size (column 4): log of total sales. Productivity (column 5): log of
total factor productivity. Panel A: Dftrade: ﬁrm is foreign-owned and has arms’ length trade only (dummy). Panel
B: Dfimport: ﬁrm is foreign-owned and has arms’ length imports only (dummy), Dfexport: ﬁrm is foreign-owned
and has arms’ length exports only (dummy), Dfimpexp: ﬁrm is foreign-owned and has arms’ length imports and
exports (dummy). Panels A and B: Dfnotrade: ﬁrm is foreign-owned and has neither intra-ﬁrm nor arms’ length
trade (dummy), Dnofnotrade: ﬁrm is domestic (i.e., not foreign-owned) and has no trade (dummy). Dummies take
value 1 if the statement holds, and 0 otherwise. All variables are in logs except for dummies.
Table B22: Productivity and size premia of foreign aﬃliates with trade, both intra-ﬁrm
and arms’ length trade and arms’ length trade only (Manufacturing sector)
Panel A: Foreign aﬃliates with trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Productivity Size Productivity Size Productivity
Dtrade 0.171 0.504*** 0.331** 0.695*** 0.195*
[0.11] [0.11] [0.16] [0.16] [0.12]
Obs 961 963 835 961 957
Panel B: Foreign aﬃliates with diﬀerent trade ﬂows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Productivity Size Productivity Size Productivity
Dimponly 0.109 0.249** 0.307* 0.361** 0.104
[0.12] [0.11] [0.17] [0.18] [0.12]
Dexponly 0.198 0.422*** 0.463** 0.647*** 0.373***
[0.16] [0.14] [0.21] [0.21] [0.14]
Dimpexp 0.243** 0.795*** 0.315* 1.060*** 0.255**
[0.12] [0.12] [0.18] [0.18] [0.13]
Obs 961 963 835 961 957
Notes: OLS estimations with control variables in all panels and all columns: skill intensity, capital intensity,
input intensity, total employment, host-country, parent-location and industry dummies. Firm size regressions
omit the log of total employment as a covariate. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level. Productivity
(column 1): log of the ratio of total sales to total employment. Size (column 2): total employment. Produc-
tivity (column 3): log of the ratio of value added to total employment. Size (column 4): log of total sales.
Productivity (column 5): log of total factor productivity. Panel A: Dtrade: ﬁrm has imports or exports, or
both (dummy). Panel B: Dimport: ﬁrm has imports only (dummy), Dexport: ﬁrm has exports only (dummy),
Dimpexp: ﬁrm has both imports and exports (dummy). Dummies take value 1 if statement holds, and 0
otherwise. All variables are in logs except for dummies.
59
Scarcity, Size and Productivity Advantage of Foreign Affiliates with Intra-Firm Trade
